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INTRODUCT IO N 
The gr owth a nd de ve l opment of the socia l s cien ces, 
particularly psycho l ogy , over the past 100 years, has been 
paralleled by an increas ing. use an d acceptance of 
psychologists as e xpert wi tnesses within the criminal 
justice system. Thi s is ha r dly surprising, and on the face 
of it, not at all cont r ov er si a l . Psychologists have come to 
be considered e xpert s in matters of human behavior (Hoch & 
Darley, 1962), and concomit a nt l y in the subset of criminally 
relevant beh a vior. As s uch , they are considered privy to 
information about crimi nals and criminal behavior which 
would otherwise be unava i lable to courts and juries, and so 
have gained accept a nc e as expert witnesses. 
Closer examin ation, however, of the psychology/criminal 
justice interface re vea l s an area teeming with ambiguity and 
controversy (Huc kabee, 1980; Shah, 1969). At one extreme 
pos i t ion a r e thos e who would severe l y restrict the role 
pl a yed by the social sciences in the courtroom (Morse, 1978; 
Szas z , 1979). At the other are those who would have the 
social sciences play a much larger role in determination of 
what exactly constitutes criminal conduct, as well as in the 
dispositions of criminal offenders (Bromberg, 1979; Lane & 
Kling, 1978; Monahan, 1977; Silverman, 1969). These two 
2 
poles, and the myriad of positions that fall between them, 
reflect the philosophical underpinnings of the varied 
conceptions of legal insanity. It is only through an 
examination of these conceptions, including their evolution 
over the years, that the role of psychology in the courts 
can be understood. Accordingly, the various tests of 
insan · ty that have been employed will be examined in some 
detail. 
This is a difficult area to get to the core of, and not 
just because it concerns the interface of two quite 
different fields, law and psychology. Rather, it is 
proposed that an essential difficulty is the fact that 
practitioners from both fields underestimate, or even 
ignore, the basic differences between these areas. The 
examination of insanity tests will show that social 
scientists have been, and continue to be, woefully 
uninformed about the workings of the legal system and the 
principles underlying it. Lawyers and judges, for their 
part, have often been bewildered and mystified by psycho-
logy, thereby being unclear as to how to accommodate the 
genuine insights psychology can provide to the criminal 
justice system. Yet despite the ignorance and confusion 
that demonstrably pervade the interface, there is room for 
optimism. There is evidence to suggest that non-expert 
jurors can, and have been, able to understand the issues and 
make appropriate decisions in ''insanity" cases (Fingarette & 
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Hasse, 1979; Moore, 1980; Witty, 1982). This is not to 
su gge s t that the psychological expert is superfluous, but 
s imply overextended in terms of his/her courtroom role. The 
s luti on t o th e confusion may l i e largely in understanding 
what j uri es have always understood, if only implicitly, 
about crimin a l r e sponsibi l ity. 
Before e xamin i ng specific insanity tests, one of the 
cornerstones of ou r cr i minal justice system must be 
explored . I refer to the fa ct t hat a criminal event 
involves not just a s pe c if i c action, but some sort of 
criminal intent i on as we l l. In considering this area, it 
becomes clear that t he traditional requirement of "mens 
rea," vari ous l y int er preted as guilty mind, evil mind or 
criminal intent (Pl a t t & Di amo nd, 1978), virtually 
necessitates some form of insanity defense, regardless of 
what it is call ed or how it is worded. Traditionally and 
properly, t he law r equires an escape valve, which will serve 
to protect those not meeting the requirements of mens rea 
f r om cr iminal r e sponsibility and prosecution. Understanding 
thi s escape valve is the key, and it is the same 
understanding attributed to juries above. 
Our current system of justice is but the latest result 
of an evoluationary process, the beginning of which predates 
I 
the formalized development of psychology and psychiatry by 
at least several hundred years. Yet, those early criminal 
justice systems invariably allowed for certain exceptions to 
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the usual presumptions of responsibility (Robinson, 1980). 
These e xcepti ons ge neral ly i nc l uded children, and those 
deemed mad , a j ud gemen t apparently made fairly easily: it 
requir ed su bst anti al ev i dence of extreme intellectual 
deficit and social malfun c tion. At this point, the decision 
to ex use was s trictly a legal and social decision; there 
was simply no other way. 
The early formaliz ed i nsan i ty tests seemed to reflect 
the popular understan d i ng of mad ness. Understanding may 
seem like a curi ous wor d to use, in light of the great lack 
of insight that pr eva iled, until relatively recently, 
regardin mental d i s orders. What was understood, however, 
if only implicitly, wa s t he no tion that lack of rationality, 
in certain situat ions a nd for certain persons, defeated, in 
part or in whol e , the ascr i ption of criminal responsibility 
(Finga r ett e & Ha sse, 1979; Moore, 1980). This notion, this 
understanding to whi ch I keep referring, has shown itself to 
be nea r ly i mpo ss i ble to satisfactorily codify, at least to 
date . 
As psyc h i atry and psychology became formalized and 
accepted, the medical model of madness concurrently achieved 
widespread acceptance, both in society and in the courts. 
Indeed, most insanity tests developed over the past 100 
years make reference to "diseases of the mind" (Hermann, 
1983). That these diseases had unknown or obscure 
etiologies and equally unknown cures was of little 
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consequence, apparently. What was important was that there 
were now social sciences with which to understand and 
humanely deal with "madmen," and the enthusiasm engendered 
by this seemingly enlightened approach was bound to infuse 
the criminal justice system. The problems which this would 
ultimately engender were initially held in check by an 
understanding among juries (an understanding now often 
for otten) that mental illness, whatever it was and wherever 
it came from, was just one factor to be considered in making 
judgements about criminal responsibility (Neu, 1980). 
Another limiting factor was the fact that insanity defenses 
were rarely used, and even more rarely used successfully. 
In any case, the criminal justice system has been 
burdened with a succession of insanity defenses which have 
been ambiguous, have typically included references to 
knowledge both personal and not verifiable, and which have 
tended to confuse or even bewilder juries. Still, juries 
continued to make the necessary judgements. But from time 
to time, close calls would arise: For any given insanity 
test, there will be persons who will unquestionably be 
deemed insane, or equally unquestionably sane. But for 
others, judgement is more difficult. Fortunately, from the 
point of view of criminal justice, psychology and psychiatry 
had progressed to the point where they could provide experts 
to help the courts deal with some of their thornier cases. 
Experts could now appear in court to explain madness: 
what i t was (invariabl y a d i sease entity), where it came 
f r om, how t o treat i t, etc. This gave rise to a 
conside r able d i ff i culty, one which persists to this day. 
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The problem is t hi s: As a rule, we don't hold a person 
responsible f or de ve l op in g ca nce r or kidney disease, so it 
would seem reasonable t o appl y t hi s same standard to mental 
illness as well . So , if crimin a l ly relevant behavior is 
directly resultant f r om men ta l i l lness, the alleged criminal 
clearly is not r es pons i bl e for his/her act, certainly no 
more than a polio vic t im is he l d responsible for his/her 
paralysis . But if me nt a l ill ness entails a lack of 
responsibility, what i s l eft for the jury to decide? The 
answer, of course , i s nothi ng , except perhaps which of the 
opposing experts to agr ee with. While this may allow for an 
illusion of judici a l decision-making, it is clear that the 
significant dete r min a t io ns are made by expert witnesses. 
While the l aw ha s ofte n , and recently (Morse, 1982), 
recognized t ha t thi s i s a bad wa y of conducting judicial 
bu si ne s s , the nature, or at least the wording, of the 
in s anity tests themselves seem to invite the social 
scientist into the courtroom. While the invitation is 
understandable, the tests rarely define how the experts 
should contribute, or how these contributions should be 
considered. "A fundamental reason for the insanity defense 
is to provide a legal framework to aid the court, the jury 
and attorneys in evaluating the testimony of psychiatrists 
and placing it in proper legal, social and moral 
perspective" (Stone, 1975, p. 227). 
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The mental health professionals who testify in criminal 
proceedings often disagree with each other, a situation 
engendering a variety of effects. As mentioned, disagree-
ment allows the jury to make a decision, even if it is not 
the one they were chosen to make. And while the "battles of 
the experts," at least in highly publicized trials, often 
result in public dissatisfaction with both the legal and 
psychological professions, a more important problem is that 
such battles tend to obfuscate the essential nature of the 
decisions the court requires be made, as well as who is best 
equipped, le ally, morally, and otherwise, to make them. 
This, then, is at the heart of the matter to be dealt 
with in this paper: What is the nature of the relationship 
between the criminal justice system and the mentally 
disturbed offender? Specifically, three questions will be 
addressed. First, what is insanity? There is of course no 
unitary answer to this question, as amply evidenced by the 
multitude of insanity tests that have been, and continue to 
be employed. Accordingly, the historical and contemporary 
insanity tests will be reviewed, along with their roots in 
mens rea and other common threads, with an aim towards 
explicating the concept of insanity. Secondly, what is the 
proper relationship between psychology and the criminal 
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justice system? This is a controversial area, and the 
answer is critically and almost inextricably linked to the 
answer to the first question of what insanity is. To get at 
the answer to this question, some central concepts from both 
the law and psychology will be considered. Also, a number 
of conflicts, both within the field of psychology 
(particularly involving the medical model), and between 
psychology and criminal justice (e.g., determinism versus 
free will, and treatment versus social control) will be 
exam i ned. Thirdly, what is the proper role of the expert 
psychological witness in criminal justice proceedings? 
Clearly, the answer to this depends very much on the answers 
to the first two questions. That, plus a consideration of 
what psychologists actually do in court, for better or 
worse, will lead to some conclusions about what, if 
anything, psychologists should be doing in court. 
A strongly critical eye is required for getting to the 
heart of the problems at this interface, and many of the 
writers I will cite are certainly critical of much that they 
see. It must be acknowledged, however, that many commen-
tators view both historical and contemporary developments in 
this area as quite benign, and see events as leading to an 
inevitable and happy union of criminal justice and clinical 
psychology (Monahan, 1977). This point of view will be 
considered as well. 
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Discussion of insanity suggests that it will never be 
finally and conclusively defined to everyone's satisfaction. 
These are matters, after all, about which reasonable people 
may reasonably disagree. Yet, despite the confusion that 
exists at the psychology/law interface, clarity of purpose, 
as well as an integration of many seemingly disparate 
viewpoints, is both desirable and attainable. I hope this 
paper will contribute to that end. 
After considering future needs for both research and 
education, I will offer a summary and conclusions, but will 
not offer my own ideas for the "ideal" insanity defense. 
Most writers on this subject do that, and I have no wish to 
contribute to the clutter. I will, however, spend some time 
considering the Disability of Mind (DOM) doctrine offered by 
Herbert Fingarette (1979), which comes closer than most 
proposals in identifying the central issues, and dealing 
with them appropriately and competently. 
CHAPTER I 
A History of Insanity 
Insanity is not a recently developed concept. As Moore 
(1980) points out, "legal insanity in some form has been an 
excuse from criminal responsibility for centuries" (p. 27). 
The criminal justice systems of most civilizations through-
out history have recognized that certain persons who commit 
what otherwise would unequivocally be considered illegal 
acts should not be held responsible for these acts. I 
refer, of course, to situations that clearly go beyond the 
traditionally employed and commonly accepted excuses of 
ignorance, accident and compulsion; inadvertant homicide is 
not considered murder, otherwise illegal acts committed at 
gunpoint generally are not prosecuted, etc. To understand 
the nature of the excuses which legal insanity provides for, 
we need to turn to the concept of "mens rea." 
Mens rea, variously interpreted as guilty mind, evil 
mind, or criminal intent, is a concept dating to antiquity: 
The principle of 'mens rea' or 'guilty mind' was 
recognized in the Talmud, which specified that 
minors, the deaf and dumb, mental defectives and 
the mentally disordered were not to be held 
culpable for crimes. The very harsh and punitive 
Greek Draconian Code also embodies mens rea in a 
very clear distinction between involuntary 
homicide and murder. Children and the insane were 
exempted from contractual obligations under the 
Code of Justinian. (Rieber & Vetter, 1978, p. 6) 
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Even at this early point, we can see the genesis of problems 
and questions which have confused and confounded society up 
to contemporary times. What exactly is mens rea? How does 
one clearly distinguish between a guilty mind and an 
innocent mind? Who is best able to make judgements 
concerning these distinctions? These, and other equally 
critical, substantive issues, will be dealt with in-depth 
later in this paper. But now, we need return to the 
historical review of the concept of insanity. 
Though the concept of mens rea is ancient, "it remained 
for Christian ethics to extend and elaborate upon its 
metaphy s ical and pragmatic ramifications" (Platt & Diamond, 
19 78, p. 55). These extensions and elaborations take the 
form of a myriad of insanity tests, of which the most 
significant will be considered shortly. Insanity generally 
refers to a legal standard: "Legal insanity is a test of 
capacity for choice and action; it is a formulation designed 
to determine responsibility" (Hermann, 1983, p. 7). This 
definition highlights a point of overriding importance, that 
being, that insanity is, first and foremost, a legal 
concept. This is easy to forget, in light of the wide 
variety of popular usages the term has acquired, as well as 
the wide variety of misuses that the term is subjected to by 
both legal and mental health professionals. However, by 
keeping the primarily legal nature of insanity uppermost in 
our minds, we can facilitate our understanding and 
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resolution of certain sharply-contested issues, including 
expert psychological testimony, that are addressed later in 
this paper. 
In his excellent review of historical insanity tests, 
Bromberg (1979) informs us that "the first available test of 
insanity dates to 1265, and was stated by Bracton, 
archdeacon of Barnstable: 'An insane person is one who does 
not know what he is doing, is lacking in mind and reason and 
is not far removed from the brutes'" ( p. 5). It is worth 
noting that this earliest of insanity tests is composed of 
ordinary, everyday language, and suggests a judgement that 
ordinary, everyday people were quite capable of making. Of 
course, there was no alternative - the social sciences had 
yet to evolve - but this is precisely the point: Insanity 
was a viable concept centuries before there were mental 
health experts to explain what it was, as well as who 
deserved to be cate~orized as insane. 
The next major test, enunciated by Sir Mathew Hale in 
1671, stated that "such a person is laboring under 
melancholy distemper hath yet ordinarily as great under-
standing a child of fourteen years hath, is such a person as 
may be guilty of treason or felony" (Bromberg, 1979, p. 5). 
This early test points out an enduring problem with insanity 
tests, which concerns the ambiguity of the language with 
which they must be composed. In this case, the term 
understanding may certainly be variously interpreted. At 
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any rate, this test asserts a strong relationship between 
intellectual deficit and excuse from criminal responsi-
bility. As Hermann (1983) explains, "Hale proceeds to 
explicit recognition of the defense of insanity; since 
liberty or freedom of the will presupposes understanding, it 
follows that where there is a total deficit of the 
understanding, there is no free act of the will in the 
choice of things or actions" (p. 25). So, if there is no 
free will, there can be no criminal intent, no mens rea, and 
no criminal responsibility ascribed. 
In 1724 Judge Tracy, in the Arnold case, provided some 
needed clarification to the Hale test in elaborating on 
understanding: "Not every kind of frantic humour ••• points 
him out to be a madman as is exempted from punishment; it 
must be a man totally deprived of his understanding and 
memory and doth not know what he is doing, no more than an 
infant, than a brute, or a wild beast" (Bromberg, 1979, 
p. 6). It is interesting to note that whereas Hale 
apparently allowed for degrees of insanity, for Judge Tracy 
it was an all or nothing affair: "Rex vs. Arnold. became 
authority for the proposition that total insanity was 
required for exculpation from a criminal conviction where 
madness was the preferred defense" (Hermann, 1983, p. 29). 
In any event, what both of these tests make clear is that 
although "craziness" may be a necessary precondition to a 
determination of insanity, it alone is certainly 
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insufficient for making that judgement. The question is not 
"is this person crazy"? but rather, "is this person crazy 
enough to be considered insane"? 
Next to be considered is the Hadfield case of 1800. 
The defense attorney, Erskine, offered the following 
defense: "By insanity, I mean that state when the mind is 
under the influence of delusions, where the reasoning 
proceeds upon something which has no truth ... but vainly 
built upon some morbid image formed in a distempered 
imagination" (Bromberg, 1979, p. 7). This defense was 
accepted and simplified (perhaps oversimplified) by Judge 
Kenyon: "If a man is in a deranged state of mind at the 
time, he is not criminally responsible for his acts" 
(Hermann, 1983, p. 32). 
Several aspects of this test merit comment. For one, 
this test is a departure from "wild beast" in that the 
emphasis has shifted from the absence or deficit of 
intellect to the presence of morbid delusions. For another, 
this test seems to be a step backward in precision, for 
whereas Judge Tracy specified the conditions that would 
excuse, Judge Kenyon simply referred to derangement. 
Finally, Hadfield may be viewed as the first modern insanity 
test, insofar as it clearly anticipates one of the currently 
used tests, that of the American Law Insistute (ALI): "This 
charge (Hadfield) approached the standard most recently 
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adopted in one American jurisdiction (ALI), that where the 
capacity to appreciate or conform is impaired, the defendant 
is not culpable and cannot justly be held responsible" 
(Hermann, 1983, p. 32). 
It must be mentioned at this point that we are now 
considering the time period when the medical model of 
insanity was beginning to hold sway. Indeed, "by 1800, many 
of the influential writers on the subject agreed that in 
nearly every case of insanity there was a disease of the 
brain" (Robinson, 1980, p. 37). 
The last significant test prior to M'Naghten arose from 
the Bellingham case in 1812, which saw a change in emphasis 
from 'deprivation of understanding' to 'distinguishing good 
from evil"' (Bromberg, 1979, p. 7). Once more we see an 
erosion of intellectual criteria, clearly inherent in the 
idea of understanding, and substitution of criteria which 
are broader and ambiguous, adding as they do emotional and 
even religious components to the cognitive basis. 
Perhaps the most well-known legal definition of 
insanity is the M'Naghten test (M'Naghten's Case, 1843). 
Although not a breakthrough in any real sense, the test is 
significant in that it is still widely used today (including 
in the state of Florida). The test itself states "that to 
establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be 
clearly proved that at the time of committing the act, the 
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party accused was laboring under such defect of reason, from 
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality 
of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did 
not know he was doing what was wrong." The emphasis on the 
ability to understand the difference between right and wrong 
has led many to refer to M'Naghten as the "right and wrong" 
test. 
As stated, M'Naghten broke no new ground: "The 'right 
and wrong' test was used in England to determine the 
criminal capacity of children as early as the fourteenth 
century. It has been widely used in the United States for 
both children and the insane since 1800. The essential 
concept and phraseology of the rule were already ancient and 
thoroughly embedded in the law'' (Platt & Diamond, 1978, 
p. 78). Yet even though M'Naghten said nothing really new, 
it is still in widespread use over 140 years later, and for 
that reason alone is deserving of close scrutiny. 
One noteworthy aspect of this test is the reference to 
"disease of the mind." Although the medical model of 
madness had been gaining ground for some time, it had not 
been codified in law until this point. Since that time, the 
concept of "mental disease" has become an institutionalized 
aspect of virtually all insanity defenses, despite the fact 
that it is a concept of constantly changing, not to mention 
ambiguous criteria. "Common to all tests is the use of the 
concept 'mental illness' or 'mental disease'. However, it 
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is a common failure of these tests that they lack signifi-
cant definition or provision of normative criteria for the 
concept of 'mental disease'" (Hermann, 1983, p. 129). 
M'Naghten, in emphasizing knowledge of right and wrong, 
clearly establishes an intellectual, or cognitive definition 
of insanity, and as such, may be accurately viewed as a 
reversion to earlier standards. Consequently, M'Naghten, at 
least in terms of how it is most often interpreted, provides 
a relatively narrow definition of insanity, applicable to 
few people in rare circumstances. "The M'Naghten ruling has 
been viewed as a restrictive ruling reflecting an outmoded 
and discredited faulty psychology, which classified mental 
processes into cognitive, emotional and control components 
and considered a person as insane only if serious cognitive 
or intellectual impairment was evident. Consequently, the 
M'Naghten ruling tends to limit the definition of insanity 
to a condition suffered by the most deteriorated psychotics" 
(Rieber & Vetter, 1978, p. 49). This statement makes it 
clear why insanity defenses, in jurisdictions where 
M'Naghten is operative, are rarely raised and even more 
rarely successful. More importantly, however, this 
statement reflects an often seen and critical confusion 
about the relationship between criminal justice and social 
science. Specifically, Rieber and Vetter have based their 
remarks on a ·faulty assumption, namely that the criminal 
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justice system is obliged to follow trends and developments 
within the field of psychology, and to alter its standards 
of criminal responsibility accordingly. This point of view 
is not only logically indefensible, but potentially 
dangerous as well. The problem with subverting, even in 
part, the field of criminal justice to the field of 
psychology 1, especially considering the extremely 
disparate natures of these two areas, is that justice and 
our democratic ideals may be threatened. This will become 
clearer when expert psychological testimony is discussed, 
which will amply illustrate the dangers in question. For 
now, it will suffice to note an origin of these problems in 
M'Naghten itself, which exhibits the beginning of a shift in 
decision-making responsibility from lay juror to expert 
witness: "M'Naghten removes such considerations (e.g., 
delusions) from the opinions and reflections of jurors and 
locates them in the realm of 'expert testimony' where 
questions of physiology must be settled" (Robinson, 1980, 
p. 41). 
Just a year after M'Naghten, an important decision was 
handed down in an American trial. The decision in the 
Rogers (1844) case broke with the past in asserting that 
simply the presence of mental disturbance might suffice to 
excuse from criminal responsibility: "The jury must 
acquit - even when there is a sense of right and wrong, even 
when the delusion and the act have no coherent relation -
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when it is shown that the prisoner was of diseased mind and 
the act was the result of disease" (Robinson, 1980, p. 50). 
Despite its vagueness and absence of guidance it provides 
for making the required judgement, the Rogers case sustained 
an influence over considerations of insanity, particularly 
in the United States, for w~ll over a hundred years. 
Indeed, the famous Durham rule of 1953, which will be 
considered shortly, is directly anticipated by Rogers. 
As stated earlier, M'Naghten was a test that foe '~ed on 
the cognitive aspects of mental functioning. "The M'Naghten 
Rule asserts that responsibility is a function of the 
intellect" (Leifer, 1964, p. 825). But many authorities 
thought, and continue to think, that such a focus provided 
an incomplete, or even distorted understanding of those 
criminal acts and actors warranting a determination of 
insanity. Thus, "the claim that M'Naghten focused 
exclusively on cognition led to the development of the 
'irresistible impulse' doctrine as supplemental to M'Naghten 
in some states" (Hermann, 1983, p. 38). The doctrine 
itself, first codified in the Parsons case (Parsons v. 
State, 1887), states that a person should be considered 
insane if "though conscious of the nature of the act and 
able to distinguish between right and wrong and know that 
the act is wrong, yet his will, by which I mean the 
governing power of his mind, has been otherwise than 
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voluntarily so completely destroyed that his actions are not 
subject to it, but are beyond his control" (pp. 886-887). 
A problem here is that although irresistible impulse is 
generally considered as a supplement to M'Naghten, what it 
actually does is provide an alternative. This doctrine 
states that a person whose cognitive faculties are intact 
may still be found insane if his mind is disturbed in 
anot er area. "Succinctly put, the irresistible impulse 
doctrine is a test for insanity that holds that account 
should be taken of the effect of insanity upon emotions and 
will power" (Hermann, 1983, p. 38). It thus becomes clear 
that the adoption of irresistible impulse owes at least as 
much to the thinking underlying Rogers (and Durham) as it 
does to the perceived shortcomings of the M'Naghten rule. 
The Durham decision (Durham v. U.S., 1954), also 
known as the "product test," simply states that "an accused 
is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the 
product of mental disease or defect" (p. 54). This test 
clearly reflects the thinking underlying Rogers, which 
refused to require a direct, causal relationship to be 
established between some specific aspect of mental 
disturbance and a specific illegal act. Instead, it 
requires only that the existence of some sort of mental 
disturbance be established, and a demonstration that, 
somehow, this disturbance resulted in a criminal act. This 
loosening of judicial standards reflects a triumph for the 
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medical model, which was indeed the intent. "This test was 
envisioned as an improvement on M'Naghten in that it moved 
away from moral judgments to the more factual basis of 
medical concepts" (Brakel & Rock, 1971, p. 381). Although 
the "factual" basis of psychiatric concepts is debatable at 
best (and will be explored later), it is a notion that has 
largely been accepted by society at large and by the 
judicial system in particular. It is therefore hardly 
surprising that ''Durham was decided explicitly to facilitate 
psychiatrists in placing their knowledge before the court, 
which they felt they could not do under the M'Naghten test" 
( Moore, 1980, p. 37). 
Thou gh Durham was designed to allow greater latitude 
for expert psychiatric testimony, it in fact went too far. 
Psychiatrists moved away from the roles of advisors and 
providers of information, to the roles of decision-makers, 
from witness status to that of the triers of facts. Indeed, 
"many psychiatrists interpreted Durham as an invitation for 
them to decide who should and who should not be held 
criminally responsible" (Dershowitz, 1968, pp. 29-30). 
The ability of psychiatry to expand its influence in 
court was further heightened by the nature of the terms used 
in the Durham rule, specifically mental illness, mental 
defect and product. This contributed to the impression that 
the required decisions were medical and not legal. Further, 
the varying interpretations these terms may be given, even 
22 
within the psychiatric community, tended to allow for a wide 
variety of psychiatric testimony. "The imprecision of the 
definitions of these critical terms are the greatest defect 
in the Durham opinion, and subsequent efforts at clarifica-
tion did not prove satisfactory" (Hermann, 1983, p. 46). 
The increase in psychiatric influence in the criminal 
courtroom necessarily resulted in a parallel diminution of 
the jury's power and responsibilities. Quite simply, the 
Durham rule eroded the traditional and rightful charge of 
juries to make judgments about criminal culpability. "One 
problem was that there was no standard by which the jury 
could make a determination as to whether or not the 
defendant ought to be held responsible if medical experts 
testified that the act was produced by a mental disease or 
defect" (Huckabee, 1980, p. 16). 
This shift in the responsibility for judicial decision-
making is directly attributable to the faulty assumption, 
discussed earlier, that M'Naghten was based on an outmoded 
psychology and was therefore inappropriate as a legal 
standard. In fact, the Durham rule is the best example we 
have of the confusion that pervades the psychology/criminal 
justice interface, and clearly illustrates how this 
confusion is linked to the inability, or unwillingness, of 
each field to come to grips with the essential and critical 
differences, in terms of philosophy, perspective and 
operations, that exist between the two fields. "(Durham) 
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changes the legal definition of responsibility from a 
competent intellect to a well integrated personality. This 
is to assume that the M'Naghten ruling was an erroneous 
characterization of human nature rather than a criterion for 
the ascription of legal responsibility, and betrays the 
psychiatric tendency to redefine all human events in its own 
terms" (Leifer, 1964, p. 827). 
The Durham rule was subjected to substantial criticism, 
and was ultimately supplanted by the test proposed by the 
American Law Institute. The ALI test (United States v. 
Brawner, 1972), finalized in 1962 and now recognized as the 
standard for insanity within the federal court system, 
states that "a person is not responsible for criminal 
conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result of 
mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity 
either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law." Even a 
cursory glance at this test reveals that it contains nothing 
that is truly new, much less revolutionary. Instead, we 
have a modernized rehash of earlier tests, once again 
associated with the misguided assumption that legal 
standards should be formulated in accordance with 
contemporary psychological thought. "Basically, it recasts 
the M'Naghten test and the irresistible impulse test in 
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terms felt to be compatible with modern psychiatric opinion" 
(Hermann, 1983, p. 50). 
It is not surprising that those who embrace the 
"misguided assumption" discussed above, who favor the 
increasing influence of psychology on the judicial system, 
are likely to view ALI as a definite advance over earlier 
tests. For example, psychiatrist Walter Bromberg, who views 
both psychiatry and criminal justice in terms of their 
potential for social engineering, thinks ALI is a better 
test: "The essential improvement over M 'Naghten was the use 
of the word 'appreciate' rather than 'know' to include the 
full meaning of cognition with its emotional component" 
Bromberg, 1979, p. 55). 
On the other hand, and as had become customary in this 
review of insanity tests, we again see serious problems with 
the definition and interpretation of critical terms. 
"Appreciate" is one such term, which the ALI rule does not 
even attempt to define. Of course, if a jury cannot 
adequately comprehend the term, it is likely that psychiatry 
will be given that much more leeway to explain it. To the 
extent that this is valid, we have a better insight into the 
approval psychiatry bestows upon "appreciate," as well as a 
strong suggestion that psychiatry conceded little influence 
after all when Durham was left by the wayside. 
A similar discussion is applicable to an even more 
contentious phrase, "substantial capacity": 
Mental illness or defect is defined variously by 
various authorities, but what constitutes 
substantial capacity? Where does capacity start 
to become insubstantial or when does it cease to 
be insubstantial, nonsubstantial? That is really 
the question which, when we take the stand in such 
matters, the courts have to grapple with. 
(Portnow, 1974, p. 7005) 
Portnow asks some good questions, but offers no 
answers. This is not to single out Portnow, for these 
questions are not really psychiatric ones, and there is 
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really no reason to presume that psychiatry has any special 
insight into them. Indeed, Huckabee notes that "over the 
years since the development of the ALI test, psychiatrists 
have conceded to me that they do not really know what the 
word substantial in the ALI test means" (Huckabee, 1980, 
p. 22) • 
Though psychiatry may be confused by the wording or 
phraseology of insanity statutes, such confusion rarely 
translates into reduced testimonial zealousness in the 
courtroom. Also noteworthy is the tendency of psychiatry to 
place the burden of resolving contentious issues completely 
upon the shoulders of the judiciary (Portnow says the 
courts have to grapple). This is accompanied by an equal 
and opposite effort on the part of the criminal justice 
system. Indeed, the literature is replete with examples of 
both camps washing their hands of problematic areas, 
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insisting that the other side must deal with them. This 
incessant shirking of what should be mutual concerns poses a 
s ignifi cant imped i ment to progress is dealing with, much 
le s s res olv i ng, problems of the law/psychology interface. 
Though M' Nagh t en and ALI are the predominant insanity 
tests at this t i me, other standards are in use. California, 
for example, has been a leader in the development and use of 
the doct r ine of d imi n i shed capacity . This doctr i ne is based 
on the assumption that "cr imin a l i nt en t - indeed the 
capacity for premedi ta ti on and malice, is altered by mental 
or emotional d isor der s a nd reduces the degree of the crime" 
(Diamond , B. L., i n T . G. Harris, 1969, p. 55). Specifi-
cally, the doctrine hol ds t hat a defendant is held 
responsible for a l esser cr i me than he would be if there 
were no ment a l illn ess or incapacity (Harris, 1969). 
The probl ems an d shortcomings of the other insanity 
t e sts discuss ed earlier are generally applicable to 
dimin is hed ca pacity, and need not be repeated here. 
However, all those problems take on a larger significance 
in sofar as diminished capacity effectively increases the 
scope of psychiatric excusing. "A defendant's degree of 
mental impairment may qualify him for a successful defense 
of diminished capacity but not for support of the insanity 
plea. This is consistent with the cases and 
authorities ..• indicating that less serious mental 
disorders are admissible under the mens rea concept than 
under the insanity defense" (Huckabee, 1980, p. 38). 
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There can be no doubt that diminished capacity 
represents an expanded, medical model insanity defense, with 
greater opportunity for, and a broader scope of expert 
psychiatric testimony. Not surprisingly, some curious 
defenses have been raised under diminished capacity. 
Perhaps the most notable is the "Twinkie" defense, success-
fully employed by Dan White, who in November 1978 killed San 
Francisco's mayor and one of its supervisors. The killings 
were apparently carefully planned and executed. Part of the 
defense included psychiatric testimony as to the effects of 
White's overindulgence in junk food. White was found guilty 
of a lesser charge, and was recently released from 
incarceration. There can be little doubt that "today, 
psychiatrists can be found to tell a jury that almost any 
stressful situation, from habitual gambling to a junk food 
diet should be considered in assessing a person's 
responsibility for his acts" (Newman & Rogers, 1983). Given 
the increased public awareness of, as well as public policy 
recognition of the nature of and problems regarding stress, 
the above definitely points in the direction of increased 
psychiatric influence on the criminal justice system. 
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The use of the term mens rea in the quote above about 
diminished capacity, requires explanation. At the outset of 
this paper, mens rea was defined as guilty mind, or evil 
mind, and certainly could not coexist with a determination 
of insanity. However, the term has now acquired, at least 
in this country, a new and specialized meaning, wherein mens 
rea is ''used to denote specific mental states that are 
required, by the definitions of specific criminal offenses, 
to accompany the acts that produce or threaten harm" 
(Hermann, 1983, p. 111). This shift in meaning represents a 
change from a moral judgment to one that is morally neutral. 
This · s viewed as a positive step by those who advocate the 
doctrine of diminished capacity, wherein psychiatric 
testimony d · rectly on mens rea, in terms such as purposely, 
knowingly, recklessly, negligently, etc., is permitted. But 
it is clear that this process involves a marked departure 
from the intent of most insanity defenses, and is not a 
proper substitute for them. ''The defense of insanity ... 
does not necessarily deny that the accused possessed the 
mens rea incorporated in the definition of the offense 
charged; rather, it is an overriding 'sui generis' defense 
that is concerned not with what the actor did or believed 
but with what kind of person he is" (Hermann, 1983, p. 13). 
While this perhaps overstates the case, it does serve to 
remind us of the essential moral element inherent in most 
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insanity defenses, an element striking by its absence in the 
legally neutral mens rea, or diminished capacity defenses. 
It is clear that this morally neutral approach allows 
for greater latitude in expert psychiatric testimony. Since 
the specialized definition of mens rea is inherent in 
virtually all criminal statutes, as expressed in the concept 
of criminal intent, the potential for greater psychiatric 
influence in criminal court is obvious. Indeed, "the 
ultimate victory for those who desire the medical model 
would be the total abolition of the traditional insanity 
defense, and substitution of wide open psychiatric testimony 
directly on mens rea" (Huckabee, 1980, p. 63). 
One more test will be considered before concluding this 
history of insanity. I refer to the "justly responsible" 
test, formulated by Judge Bazelon, an active figure in the 
law/psychology interface. The test states that "a defendant 
is not responsible if at the time of his unlawful conduct 
his mental and emotional processes or behavior controls were 
impaired to such an extent that he cannot justly be held 
resp on s i b 1 e for his act" (Hermann , 1 9 8 3 , p. 5 6 ) • Wh i 1 e in 
some ways this test is a vast improvement over the others I 
have discussed, it is of quite-limited utility. It puts the 
decision-making authority squarely in the hands of the jury, 
where it rightly belongs, by avoiding language which would 
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seem to require experts to assist in needed determinations, 
and even to make decisions themselves. It tells the jury 
what it needs to decide. Yet it doesn't provide a clue as 
to how the decision should be arrived at. Hermann (1983) 
elaborates on the pros and cons: 
A principle feature of the Bazelon formulation is 
that it avoids any explicit reference to mental 
disease or defect. This avoids the often 
misleading formulations of psychiatric diagnosis 
and nomenclature, and directs attention to the 
critical question of whether the defendant lacked 
understanding and the ability to make a meaningful 
choice of action ... Under the justly responsible 
standard the jury is given the power to redefine 
the law in each case; the major defect of the 
justly responsible standard is that it fails to 
set a legal standard. (p. 58) 
The above discussion of insanity is intended to provide 
an essential background to an investigation of expert 
psycholo ical testimony. Several points bear repeating. 
First and foremost, it cannot be emphasized too strongly 
that "insanity is a legal matter, that is, a matter 
involving social and moral values and principles, and not 
simply a medical-scientific matter" (Neu, 1980, p. 82). 
Second, the concepts of understanding and rationality seem 
common to all insanity tests, either explicitly or 
implicitly. It is important to remember that these terms, 
although used by mental health professionals, do not belong 
to them, and are quite usable by and comprehensible to 
average persons. Finally, though I have criticized many 
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insanity tests for unduly allowing the expansion of 
psychiatric influence in court, it is important to note that 
a good insanity defense will provide for a sense of balance 
and perspective in criminal proceedings, in which mental 
health professionals are involved. "A fundamental reason 
for the insanity defense is. to provide a legal framework to 
aid the court, the jury and attorneys in evaluating the 
testimony of psychiatrists and placing it in proper legal, 
social and moral perspective" (Huckabee, 1980, p. 66). 
CH APTER II 
Law and Psychology 
As a fi r s t step t owards examining the confusion that 
exists at the psycho logy / l aw interface, we need first 
e xamine the partic ul ar confusions that each field brings to 
this juncture . Since t he i nsa nity defense is, as previously 
stated , a legal st a ndar d, I wi ll begi n wit h the law. 
Ins anity pr ovid es for an ex c use from criminal 
culpability. But on wha t , precisely, is this excuse based? 
Moore (1980) outlines t he c ommonly understood bases: "In 
criminal law as in mo ra l s, two ge neral sorts of conditions 
excuse: ignorance that i s not itself culpable, and 
compulsion. There ar e thu s basicall y two kinds of 
traditional insanity t ests: those based on the ignorance of 
the mentally ill acc used person; and those based on some 
notion of hi s being c ompelled to act as he did" (p. 31). 
This statement at f irs t appears to be both simply factual 
a nd not at al l con t roversial. M'Naghten would appear to be 
a defense ba se d on i gnorance, while irresistible impulse 
would appear to be virtually synonymous with compulsion. 
However, upon close scrutiny, the relationships between 
insanity and ignorance, and between insanity and compulsion, 
do not hold up very well. In point of fact, ignorance is, 
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mor e often than not, clearly insufficient for criminal 
ex c ul pa t ion . I am no less gu il ty of murder if I kill Jones 
by mist ake when I intended to kill Smith. The law does not 
a llow me to for ge t t ha t armed robbery is a crime, and if I 
a t tack someone under t he mistaken belief that this person 
means me harm , t hi s is sti l l an assault. In short, 
ignorance per se woul d not seem a good basis for an insanity 
defense , yet this s eem s to directly conflict with the 
apparently cl e a r cut re l a ti onship between ignorance and 
insanity which test s s uc h as M'Naghte n apparently embody. 
What then is t he proper relationship between ignorance and 
responsibility? 
Fingarett e a nd Hasse (19 79 ) prov i de a fascinating and 
compelling analysi s of th is issue, preparatory to the 
introduction of th e i r " Di sability of Mind" doctrine, which 
will be explored later. What they suggest is that it is the 
rel ati onship between ignorance and insanity, and not 
ignora nc e per se, that is of critical importance: 
When we do al l ow exculpatory force to such a 
back ground of false beliefs, beliefs normally 
i rr e levant to exculpation, what we require is 
their rootedness in mental derangement. This 
ex c ulpatory condition is distinctive and 
essential, and is neither reducible to nor 
translatable into terms of mistaken or false 
beliefs, for these alone would NOT exculpate in 
this context. It is the well that is poisoned, 
not the cup. (p. 33) 
In fact, the very notion of mistake seems to lose much of 
its meaning without a presumption of rationality. Without 
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the capacity to be correct, to choose correctly, it seems 
senseless to speak of being mistaken. It is clear that, at 
least in this context, mistake and madness are mutually 
exclusive concepts, and the former, therefore, can hardly be 
considered as good evidence for the latter: "If the 
insanity defense is to be reasoned about at all, then, it is 
essential to see at the outset that it is likely to be a 
distinctive defense whose real significance lies in its 
contrast with such defenses as ignorance or mistake, that 
presuppose the basic capacity for rational conduct'' 
(Fingarette & Hasse, 1979, p. 25). 
Perhaps the insanity tests themselves deal with this 
criticism insofar as they usually make reference to mental 
disease or defect. However, these concepts are fraught with 
their own problems, and their use does not really challenge 
the perception that it is ignorance, albeit perhaps an 
extreme case of such, that exculpates. The tests contain, 
however badly worded or expressed, the essential concepts 
necessary for understanding the exculpatory basis for the 
insanity defense. They simply fail to express the proper 
relationship between them, and so proper emphasis is 
misplaced: "In summary, the basic truth about the 'not 
knowing' and •not appreciating' clauses is that they do not 
in themselves express an ultimately exculpatory ground. 
Rather, they in turn derive such exculpatory significance as 
they do have in the insanity context from the reference back 
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to their source in mental disability, in the more radical 
condition of mind that amounts to impairment of capacity for 
rational control of conduct" (Fingarette & Hasse, 1979, 
p. 43). 
Fingarette and Hasse apply a similar analysis to the 
concept of compulsion. Aside from the perhaps insoluble 
problem of distinguishing an irresistible impulse from an 
impulse that is not resisted, it is clear that compulsion, 
per se, provides little, if any insight into "insane" 
criminal conduct. "Viewed from the standpoint of involun-
tariness as strictly conceived in criminal law, the conduct 
one sees in insanity seems to me a model of 'voluntary' 
conduct. It is (typically) purposeful, intentional and 
effectively executed; it is often premeditated, planned and 
prepared" (fingarette & Hasse, 1979, p. 15). Crudely put, 
the "insane" killer wanted his victim to be dead, and 
obviously accomplished this. This is not to say that the 
killer may not rightfully be deemed insane, only that lack 
of voluntariness is a concept that is insufficient for 
arriving at that judgment. This assimilation of insanity to 
involuntariness finds its origins in dubious, complicated 
and obscure connections, and is therefore likely to continue 
to be a troublesome issue at the law/psychology interface. 
And so we see that although insanity defenses appear to 
be, and function as if they are truly based on the 
traditional defenses of ignorance and compulsion, they are, 
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in fact, attempting to deal with a more profound truth, with 
a level of understanding that at once contains and 
transcends such particulars as ignorance and compulsion. 
Sadly, however, and perhaps only because of the deceptive 
simplicity with which these specifics present themselves, 
the larger, more significant but more difficult concept of 
rationality is deprived of the primary consideration it 
merits in determinations of insanity. Based as it is upon a 
lon g , historical tradition, this problem of improper 
emphasis, which is now a major point of confusion which the 
law brings to the law/psychology interface, will be 
d i fficult to overcome. 
I have used the term responsibility before. In fact, 
this paper began by defining insanity as an excuse from 
criminal responsibility. However, the term can be, and is, 
used in different ways in different contexts, so some 
clarification is in order. Moore (1980) explains the 
retrospective use of the term, which is the operative usage 
in the context of insanity: "We hold people responsible for 
certain events in the past. We make such 'ascriptions of 
responsibility' based on a host of criteria, involving 
concepts of causation, intention, voluntariness and action, 
and matters of justification or excuse" (p. 25). This 
definition is useful for two reasons. Firstly, it correctly 
asserts that responsibility is an ascription - not a fact, 
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no t a scientific question, not a problem of right and 
wr ong - bu t qu i te sim ply a j udgment or evaluation that all 
s ort s of people have always made about all sorts of other 
people . Secondl y, i n show i ng that there are numerous 
c r iteria that may be considered in ascribing responsibility, 
it s trongly sugge s t s why th~ term is so variously used. 
People are fr ee t o ascr i be as they wish, and given the 
variety of criteria th ey ma y consider, it is not at all 
surprisin th a t id e a s o f what co nstitutes being responsible 
often differ signifi ca ntly . It is not surprising, for 
e xample, that on e person will consider a particular 
lawbreaker as clearly res ponsib l e and guilty of a crime, 
while the next will cons i der him as equally clearly 
no -responsible and ins a ne . Ne ther person is inherently 
right or wrong; ea ch is simply, for reasons involving 
personality, experi ence, culture, etc., making a different, 
a nd perhaps, equal l y valid ascription. 
Howeve r , thi s pro cess does not translate into court 
ve r y well (rec a ll Bazelon's justly responsible test). 
J ur i e s ca nno t make up the law as they go along. Fortu-
nately, the law has endeavored, if not always successfully, 
to develop a more consistent ascription of responsibility, 
based upon a much more limited set of criteria. I turn now 
to the prepotent criterion, understanding. 
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Understanding is another term which, like 
responsibility, defies simple and even singular definition. 
Again, understanding is properly viewed as a term of 
ascription. Furthermore, the term is illuminated by the 
relationship that exists between ascriptor and ascriptee. 
11 0nly if we can see another being as one who acts to achieve 
some intelligibl end in light of some rational beliefs will 
we understand him in the same fundamental way that we 
understand ourselves and our fellow men in everyday life" 
(Moore, 1980, p. 61). This makes clear the fact that a 
determination that someone lacks, or does not lack under-
standing is a complex and social procedure, involving 
elements of individual psychology, social and moral 
judgment. Of course, this process is well suited to a court 
of law, where conflicts between individual and society are 
resolved, and moral judgment s are constantly made. This 
should remind us that whereas specific aspects of under-
standing, or rationality, may be singled out for scrutiny 
and evaluation by professional social scientists, these 
reductions are not the same as, and are no substitute for, 
the lar er and richer concept of understanding, replete with 
its philosophical and sociological components. 
Having acquired a clearer sense of the concept of 
understanding, we can now examine its relationship to 
responsibility, of which it is a primary constituent. "The 
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Renaissance idea of individuality and the Enlightenment's 
emphasis on understanding as a precondition for responsi-
bility combine to provide the essential preconditions for 
criminal pu ishment, i.e., individual responsibility. The 
insanity defense developed in the modern period as a device 
for precluding criminal responsibility where the mental 
condition of a defendant was such that he lacked under-
standing" (Hermann, 1983, p. vi). In short, where there is 
no understa ding there is equally no responsibility. It 
wou d also seem to follow that when there is decreased or 
limited understanding, there should be a corresponding 
diminu ion of ascribed responsibility, and, therefore, 
criminality. 
We also need to keep in mind that there is no automatic 
relationship between mental disturbance and deficits in 
understandi g: "The significant issue, then, is not whether 
an individual suffered from some form of mental illness but 
whether, as a result of a mental illness, the person lacked 
understanding and control of his actions at the time he 
acted" (Hermann, 1983, p. 8). While the reference to mental 
illness actually confounds the issue, the statement is 
sufficiently awkward to illustrate the difficulty in trying 
to articulate the relationship between understanding, or 
rationality on the one hand, and ignorance and involuntari-
ness on the other. The former terms form the context in 
40 
which the latter ones operate. Ignorance and involuntari-
ness lose their meaning when divorced from the more 
fundamental, more meaningful, and perhaps more human concept 
from which they spring. I turn now to another confounding 
construct, namely mental illness. 
The concept of mental illness is an integral part of 
the concept of insanity. All insanity tests in current use 
make expl . cit reference to mental illness (or mental 
disease, or mental defect, etc.). Of course, this reference 
to mental illness both facilitates and sustains the use of 
psychologists as expert witnesses in court. However, no 
insanity test specifies precisely what is meant by mental 
illness, or even elaborates on meaningful criteria. Rather, 
it is resented as a given, as a unitary, precise and 
accepted concept about which the psychological community has 
achieved consensus. It is presumed t o be a matter not 
analagous to, but coequal to physical illness. In short, 
mental illness is considered to be a matter of fact, a fact 
about which experts may be expected to provide specialized 
information and insight. Just how valid is this assessment? 
Leifer (1964), in an analysis akin to Moore's earlier 
remarks about responsibility, challenges the "factual" 
nature of mental illness: "Neither 'intention' not 'mental 
disease' are facts, but are ascriptive terms like 
responsibility .•. The determination that a defendant has 
mental illness is based on certain facts about his behavior, 
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and is therefore, let us be clear, not an additional fact, 
but a name for a class of facts" (p. 829). Writing over 20 
years ago, Leifer seems to have foreseen the ascending 
position of the concept of mental illness in insanity 
considerations, and his criticism is now more than ever well 
taken, at least as an attempt at balancing the now almost 
uncritical acceptance of this concept. On the other hand, 
t is critique does little more than illustrate the 
distinction between physical and functional disorders, a 
distinction which, in and of itself, has little relevance 
to, and holds no interest for criminal justice. However, 
u on furt er investigation, we arrive at more complex and -
compelling issues of science and philosophy, issues largely 
ignored by criminal justice, and poorly understood when they 
are considered. In short, we shall discover that it is not 
so much th concept of mental illnes s that poses problems 
for the court system, but rather its rootedness in a social 
science which, in many ways and perhaps almost by 
definition, translates quite poorly to the legal arena. 
This idea will be explored shortly, but first I need turn to 
an important aspect of mental illness, about which people 
have had their "facts" straight for a very long time. 
I have been using the term mental illness in its 
primarily technical and professional sense (or senses). 
Despite the many and varied uses and meanings it has, mental 
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illness is a central concept in all the social sciences. 
However, it is also a concept which the population at large 
has used, in one way or another, for centuries. Further, 
the popular concept has remained relatively stable, 
consistent and consensual to this date. "Our ancient 
paradigm of mental illness .•. is reserved for those gross 
deviations from intelligibility we still capture with the 
more evere statements, 'he is crazy ,' or 'he is insane,' or 
'h is mad.• These notions capture the essential notion of 
the ancient conception of mental illness as madness; that 
mentally ill people are different from us in ways that we 
find hard to understand" (Moore, 1980, p. 60). Once again 
we see the centrality of the concept of rationality, both as 
a criterion for ascribing responsibility, and also as a 
significant process within those doing the ascribing. Once 
again we see the determination of insanity to be a social 
and moral procedure. Moore (1980) elaborates on the 
criteria involved in the "popular" conception of mental 
illness: "There is an old, socially-sanctioned, well 
established set of views which supports the identification 
of mental illness only with the violent, extreme psychoses, 
and within this context of ideas, mental illness emerges as 
the ultimate catastrophe that can happen to a human being" 
(p. 61). These views are contemporary as well as 
historical and are in fact the bases for many insanity , 
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tests. Indeed, Moore goes on to point out that ''each of 
these tests is best viewed as an attempt to adjust the then 
prevailing views about mental illness to well established 
moral and legal paradigms of excuses from responsibility'' 
p. 31). One might well ask at this point where the problem 
• 
is! We have seen that the prevailing views about mental 
illness have been relatively constant, and legal paradigms 
generally exhibit a similar constancy. I suggest that a 
major proble1 has arisen due to the substitution of a 
technical and professional meaning of mental illness for the 
popular and historical usage just discussed. When Moore 
(1980) says that ''mental illness has for centuries been a 
concept dealt with by the law because it negates, in some 
way or another or to some degree, the basic postulate of 
responsibility on which the law rests" (p. 25), he is 
clearly referring to the popular usage, a meaning which 
virtually implies a tautological relationship between mental 
illness and insanity. Further, this meaning recognizes, and 
indeed compels us to recognize the social and moral nature 
of the concept of mental illness, and leads us to an 
understanding of insanity that is non-technical, and not 
professionalized. "Mental disease, at least in relation to 
criminal insanity and responsibility, is not a purely 
medical notion. It is not a matter simply for experts to 
decide; it involves the sorts of questions of social and 
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ethical value that ordinary lay people who serve on juries 
have equal competence to consider'' (Neu, 1980, p. 86). 
However, it is clear that this is not the sense of mental 
illness used by most mental health professionals, nor is it 
much in evidence in the court system. Rather, it has been 
superseded by a more technical and professional meaning(s), 
a meaning that though perhaps useful and fruitful for 
purposes of psychology, poses significant problems for the 
legal system. I turn now to this professionalized usage of 
mental illness, and to a consideration of how it and its 
rootedness in social science greatly confounds issues at the 
interface. 
If the popular usage of mental illness entails a social 
and moral determination, then the professionalized usage 
entails a scientific one. It is largely due to the presumed 
scientific nature of their endeavor that mental health 
experts have achieved status as expert witnesses. As such, 
they can provide the court with factual data pertaining to 
mental illness. But how factual are the facts? How 
scientific is the endeavor? Part of the answer is suggested 
by the generally agreed upon idea that the medical model of 
madness provides the framework for discussing and evaluating 
mental disorders. Instructive here is the fact that we are 
dealing with a medical model, not medicine, an analogy and 
not the thing itself. Perhaps then, we are also dealing 
with an analogy of science, and not science itself? 
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Robinson (1980) points out that "for an undertaking to 
be scientific, it must frame its explanations in terms of 
universal laws, which is to say that it must be in 
possession of such laws'' (p. 23). The social sciences, the 
mental health sciences, do not appear to be in possession of 
such laws. For one thing, psychology's insights and 
understandings are largely statistical in nature. This is 
to say that we know much about the aggregate, but little for 
certain about particular individuals. Two parts hydrogen 
and one art oxygen w·11 always produce water, but human 
individuals are not nearly as predictable as molecules. 
Further ev·dence is suggested by the fact that science 
attempts to explain by utilizing causes, while psychology 
more often refers to reasons. These two terms are not 
properly interchangeable, and attempts to do so result in 
serious confusion. Causes always have effects, and so are 
experimentally manipulable. Reasons, however, in referring 
to mental or logical processes, are more elusive, debatable, 
and somewhat limited in terms of predictive utility. Of 
course, matters of psychophysiology, psychopharmocology, 
nutrition, etc., are areas where causes may be properly 
considered, but then these areas have at least as much to do 
with medicine, with the traditionally understood sciences, 
as with psychology. In short, the social sciences "form a 
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separate class of inquiries, and the separation lingers no 
matter how many of the methods, concepts or findings they 
might borrow from genuinely scientific undertakings'' 
(Robinson, 1980, p. 26). 
I do not mean to su~gest that psychology is not a 
science, and its introduction into court therefore 
inappropriate. In fact, when considered unto it elf, or 
even a part of the larger system of social science, 
psycho o y would appear to meet many of the criteria for 
scientific endeavor. For example, a well-constructed 
psy hological experiment will conform to the same sorts of 
standards and practices as will one in physics. Further, 
psychology as achieved numerous and important insights and 
understanding across the entire spectrum of human 
experience. Nonetheless, it must be conceded that 
psychology, regardless of its success, or the extent to 
whic it employs the scientific method, is a breed apart 
from traditional science. Consequently, many of its 
concepts need to be considered as differing in kind, not 
just degree, from the more traditional counterparts. Shah 
(1969) considers this in discussing the concept at hand: 
It appears, then, that in contrast to the fairly 
specific objective and precise criteria for 
determining physical disease, the criteria and 
norms used in defin in mental disease are neither 
specific nor objective, nor are they separable 
from a multitude of ethical and social consider-
ations inherent in the labeling process. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, the term 'mental disease' 
is of t en a pplie d in a somew hat indiscriminate way 
to a mot ley coll e ct i on of interpersonal and social 
be ha vio rs, judg e d dev i ant according to varying 
s c hol og · cal a nd cu l t ur a norms used by persons 
ap ying such l ab el s. Und erstandably, therefore, 
t e defini t ion s t e d t o be vague and are often 
remarkably cir c ula r a nd lack ing in un iformity and 
r iabi lit . It wou ld seem that the term 'mental 
disease ' s actually use d in a metaphorical sense 
o ref e r to a var · ety of s oci al and psychological 
maladjustme ts and r elated human problems ... The 
term seems at times to.be use d as a ready explan-
at · o or a most any type of be ha vior that does 
no make se se , r evea ls no c lea r or reasonable 
mo io or distu r bs our s en s ibili ties. ( p. 24 ) 
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s o t o ar ue ag a inst th e value or utility of 
menta i ness as a sci e n t ific conc ept. For social 
c ur oses , i s sim · arity t o more standard 
s ci ent · c co c ptual ' zation ism r e t han sufficient. 
Ho we r s rou i s interaction wi th other fields of 
e dea or , r icul arl fi e lds t hat are de c idedly 
non - cient · ic , t ha t e si nif ic a nt differences from 
tradi · o a sc ence come to the f o re and pose problems of 
u derstan i Ro bin s on ( 198 0 ) , elaborating on his earlier 
remarks about un · ve rsa l l aws, points out that in law: 
a c uitt a l is base d on reasonable proof that the 
d isease was releva ntly connected to the act, and 
was not me re ly coextensive with it. What is 
r ui r ed i s con vi nc in g proof that the overwhelming 
r ajo r it y o f huma n be i ngs, were they similarly 
affect ed, co uld be plaus i bly expected to commit 
th a c t of which the personal stands accused. 
Th i s is to say that we require proof that the act 
wa s go ve rn e d by nothing less than a law of nature. 
( p. 61) 
Except for matters of brain physiology and chemistry, 
psycholog y possesses few, if any, laws of nature (Robinson, 
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1980). But this would be but a minor problem if only it 
were recognized. Instead, the substitution of the 
specialized meanings of mental illness, those used by 
professionals in psychiatry and psychology, for the long 
standing societal meanings has gone largely unnoticed. 
Further ore, this shift in meanings, which both constitutes 
and represe . ts the ascendance of the medical model of 
insan ' ty within the criminal justice system, is at once a 
cause and effect of increased psychiatric activity in the 
courtroom: "An important, if subtle, consequence of 
psychiatric involvement has been the gradual introduction of 
a medical model in place of the law's efforts to articulate 
legally relevant criteria. The cost of this substitution 
has bee co fusion of purpose" (Dershowitz, 1968, p. 29). 
The problem, then, is not that psychology is not a bona 
fide scie ce wherein, accordingly, mental illness is not a 
legitimate concept. Rather, in refusing to recognize, much 
less clarify, the essential differences between physical and 
mental illnesses, psychology has allowed itself to answer 
questions it cannot answer, and indeed should not even be 
asked. For example, the post-diction of mental states by 
experts is at best a dubious proposition. Further, such 
post-diction becomes more problematical when it opens the 
door to testimony on such non-psychological issues as 
culpability and responsibility. The ascendance of the 
medical model, with its reliance on the mental illness 
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concept, has confused both judges and juries, and distracted 
them from their primary task of evaluating and resolving 
disputes between individuals and society, disputes which 
involve essentially moral and social ct siderations. So 
long as juries are not informed about the special, unique 
nature of such "facts" as mental illness, and so long as 
mental illness remains an integral part of insanity 
statutes, continued confusion will result. Moore (1980) 
reminds us of the essential task of the jury: "If criminal 
law · s to reflect our shared notions of culpability, an 
excuse from punishment based on those moral notions ought to 
utilize those same moral criteria. The only question 
appropriate to juries is thus one appealing to their moral 
paradigm of mental · 11ness: Is the accused so irrational as 
to be non-responsible?" ( p. 62). 
To th · s point, I have discussed a number of conflicts 
and controversies that operate at the law/psychology 
interface. A question that naturally arises is whether 
these conflicts are deep-seated and inherent in the 
interface, or are just practical, albeit complicated matters 
that we could reasonably hope to resolve. Sadly, analysis 
suggests that the former is the case. At its most basic 
level, the law operates on an assumption of free will. It 
has always been such, and indeed it is hard to imagine how 
the law could function without a presumption of individual 
free agency. Psychology, on the other hand (and 
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µ rti ular l y the p yc h logy of the medi ca l mo del), opera~ es 
fr m a a most c pl etel op po site µe rspe ct i ve, t hat of 
d e ternin1s n. T e ins i ghts of quantum phy sics, wi th its 
o uncert a i nty a d · ndetermini s m, no t withstan d i ng 
c u · t e e i t · rr a t e , s · n c e they h a v e l a r g e 1 y be e n 
., 0 Ol 1 l.. o o ) ( ...., a 1·s 1 19·76), an endeavor w1icl vi e w~ 
it lf a~ s ient" f 1c , wh i c strives to ex µ l ain a nd pre dic t, 
a r · d s · sel f on i ts tr oral neutrality , could 
ar 1 func t ·o w .... ro ut a de"' e rrn i isti pr e sumptio . 
H cka e 
. w· 
( 
is 
1 9 8 0 ) s u 1m a r · z es the confli c t : 
is t he · rd erent d tern i i s m o ·· 
ch con lic ts in principle wi Lh t he 
w~ 1 . Tl e freed om of wi ll c onc e pL 
a corners one of the crimi na l la w f or 
he determ "nisti c traininl:> and 
o 1 a S f ' iatr1sts ~s in a e n t irely 
t l ra i tio . I " has been a major 
b b loc ~ i t the re atio1 s hip be 1,,we e 1 
a1 psyc iatrlsts in crimin a l l aw ma tte rs . 
e r y co lic1,, of rinciple s, o basic premises, 
w i c h not surpr "s in gly does not a llow for ne at a nd simple 
r s lut i o . In fact, t e insanity def e ns e may be viewed as 
the fund mental expression of this c onfl ic t . Stone (1975 ) 
concl udes that ''the i ns a ni ty defense is the contrad i ctor y 
juncture between a deterministic mo dern theory of causes of 
action , and an en du r ing t heor y of the morality of action. I 
c oncl ude that t he con "' r ad ic t ion is insoluble, because t he 
e p i s t. e n1 o l o g i c a 1 s t r u \,.; tu r e s r i s e on d i ff ere n t found a t i on s 11 
( p. 2 27 ) . 
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Several particular examples of this contradiction may 
serve to illuminate some of the confusion existing at the 
interface. One concerns the opposite kinds of decision 
rules employed by the law and psychology, rules which both 
give substance to and amplify the essential incompatibi lity 
between free will and determinism. 
The basic legal decision rule in criminal law 
states; ' he in doubt , acquit.' The general 
ru le in medicine may be stated as follows: 'When 
in doubt, continue to suspect illness.' There is 
a fa"rl common set, not only in psychiatrists, 
but also in clinic 1 psychologists, psychiatric 
social workers and psychiatric nurses, to look for 
signs of psychopathology and maladjustment. 
( S ah,. 19 6 9 ,. p. 26 ) 
This helps to show how a specific act, by a specific 
i dividua , can be viewed so disparately by two different 
fields These fields reflect two different viewpoints, and 
stem from two very different, and basically different, ways 
of making sense of the world. This poses no problem when 
each field stays within its particular confines. But put in 
the same room (i.e., a courtroom), the conflict becomes 
apparent and troublesome. 
Another aspect of this conflict becomes apparent in 
contrasting the treatment orientation of psychology with the 
punishment model employed by the criminal justice system. A 
psychologist is quite properly concerned with a specific 
client's psychological dysfunction in particular, and this 
client's overall welfare in general, while the court is 
primarily interested in an accused person's particular 
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criminally relevant action, and the larger issue of the 
relationship between that action an d soc i et y . Once again, 
these two orientations do not mesh wel l . ''The treatment and 
welfare orientation of psychiatri s t s is a major factor in 
the continuing problems of c r imin a l law and psychiatry. The 
interests of justice are, to a significant extent, limited 
by the treatment-oriented feelin gs of psychiatrists, rather 
than the law' (Huckabee, 1980, p . 8) . This is to suggest 
that mental health professionals , when appearing in court in 
their professional capacities, a r e to a certain extent 
bringing along their own rules, and resisting the use of 
others. Twenty years ago Judge Wa r re n Burger (1964) said he 
had ''heard psyc iatrists frankly sa y that if they conclude 
that their patient is ill and in need of treatment, they 
consider it their professional obligation to try to make 
certain that he goes to a ment a l i ns t itution rather than a 
prison, even if it is ne c e ssary t o 'tailor' their expert 
testimony to accomplish that end " ( p . 7 ). 
This conflict bet ween t r ea t ment and punishment 
orientation is clea r ly ev ident in considering evidentiary 
standar ds . While useful evidence may properly be obtained 
fr om a wi de va r ie ty of sources, the court is in no way 
ob l igated to use this evidence in the same way as it is used 
by the s ource professionals providing it. "While medical 
evidence, including medical diagnostic criteria, is 
certainly relevant for making a determination about 
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capacity, it is unlikely that the same conceptual criteria 
used for determining need of care and treatment will be 
congruent with the criteria used to determine capacity for 
conforming conduct" (Hermann, 1983, p. 129). Simply put, 
while an individual may meet all the diagnostic criteria to 
un uestionably merit a determination of psychopathology, 
there is no parallel, necessary relationship between the 
sarn ev·dence, when used in court, and any legal 
conclusion. As has often been mentioned, insanity is not a 
ps chiatric concept, and so ttere exist no diagnostic 
criteria for it. u hile psychopathologi cal diagnosis might 
suff ·c e for the mental health profes sional, what the law 
requi es is a social and moral determination that the person 
·n questio is so fundamentally different from others by 
virtue of his or her craziness that he or she cannot be 
considered a normal person to whom the usual rules apply" 
(Morse, 1978, p. 392). 
Once a ain, the decidedly non-scientific nature of 
insanity determinations is revealed. We need to keep 
reminding ourselves that although science can illuminate 
many of the aspects of human existence, it cannot answer, 
and certainly not by itself, moral questions. This in no 
way suggests that psychology cannot or should not provide 
information to the court relating to considerations of 
insanity, but only that the experts should not draw final 
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conclusions. Szasz (1984) quite accurately summarizes these 
concerns: 
T e fact is that the distinction between 
disturbance and depravity - between madness and 
badness, between mental illness and criminality, 
call it what you will - is not a specialized or 
technical judgment doctors can make because they 
possess a medical degree; or psychiatrists can 
make because they possess training in diagnosing 
ad treatin mental illness ... The distinction is a 
'moral judgment, ' which is why a jury, and no one 
else, is supposed to make it. (p. 148) 
The preceding has been an attempt to explo~e and 
exp icate some of the conflicts between the law and 
psychology, conflicts of both basic principles and practical 
orien ation. However, these confli cts are reduced to only 
minor roportions when the two systems are viewed as 
parallel, if not similar, institutional mechanisms for 
achieving social harmony. Bromberg (1979) focuses on the 
similarities between the two fields in his analysis: 
Both law and psychiatry, in spite of their 
differences in conceptualization, procedures and 
techniques, seek to codify, understand and correct 
human misbehavior through punishment, rehabilita-
tion and psychotherapy, respectively. Viewed 
broadly, the law codifies misbehavior in terms of 
the degree of the crime, while psychiatry codifies 
maladaptation in terms of diagnosis. The law aims 
to assess responsibility for misbehavior, i.e. 
crime, through the concept of intent, specific or 
general; psychiatry aims to assess the genesis of 
criminal action via study of the criminal's mental 
conflicts and personality trends. The law's goal 
is to modify behavior through punishment, 
rehabilitation ... ; psychiatry's goal is to modify 
misbehavior through medical therapy or psycho-
therapy. The justification for law is the 
attainment of justice in our socio-economic 
milieu; the justification for psychiatry is 
balancing the individual's bio-psycho-social 
system. Both disciplines represent attempts at a 
kind of social engineering. (p. 3) 
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While it is clear that both the law and psychiatry, at 
times and in part, assume functions which may usefully be 
considered as furthering social engineering purposes, to 
characterize each field as such is unwarranted. For one 
thing, most mental health professionals, and I suppose most 
legal people, would reject the idea that their primary 
function is social engineering . Bromberg's conception of 
psychiatry is rather narrow, certainly not universal, and 
largely outdated, stressin as it does adaptation, while 
i norin sue factors as growth and change. More 
important y, · t is clear that the maj ority of people seen by 
psychiatrists do not misbehave, certainly not in a legally 
relevant sens . Indeed, those deemed mentally disturbed 
show no greater inclination to criminality than does the 
population at large (Morse, 1978). Finally, in ignoring the 
important distinctions between the two fields, Bromberg 
seems to suggest that greater integration is desirable and 
easily attained, which in fact suggests increasing 
psy hiatric influence in court. 
A similar predisposition to increase psychiatric 
influence in court may be seen in the suggestion "that 
persons currently labeled 'criminal' and persons currently 
labeled 'mentally ill' should be exposed to the same kind of 
judicial decision-making process. Different directions 
56 
would be taken only after the decision to deprive the person 
of his rights had been reached" (Penn, Stover, Giebink and 
Si ndberg, 1969, p. 11). This idea, which clearly aims at 
eliminating the insanity defense as we know it, shares with 
Bromberg an implicit belief that a jury of peers is 
insufficient, or unqualifie?, to make the needed judgments. 
It is this kind of thinking which underlies the increased 
involvement of mental health professionals in court. I have 
thus far tried to show how this thinking is based on 
confusion and error, and to suggest that what appears to be 
progressive attempts at improving our criminal justice 
system have actually subverted some of its most basic 
tenets, and put the whole system in peril. This will become 
clearer in the final part of this paper, when the specifics 
of expert psychological testimony are examined. Neu (1980) 
provides the moral that I have tried to illustrate in this 
part: nwhat may seem an enlightened and humane movement for 
reform, may in fact constitute an assault, a dangerous 
assault, on freedom and dignity" (p. 100). 
CHAPTER III 
Psychologists in Court 
Having examined some of t he social, moral, legal and 
psychological issues relevant to the law/psychology 
interface, and having attained some insight into the 
origins, ·ntent and meaning of insan ity tests, it is now 
time to turn to a consideration of psychologists' actual 
conduct i criminal courtrooms , particularly those where 
insanity defenses are being employed. Psychologists fill a 
number of roles in criminal justice: they play a major part 
in determ · nations of competency to stand trial, they offer 
predictions of dangerousness for certain defendants, and 
they file am·cus curiae (friend of the court) briefs to 
provide the court with information needed for meaningful 
adjudication of particular cases, generally through such 
organizations as the American Psychological Association 
(Kolasa, 1972). 
Most importantly for purposes of this paper, 
psychologists serve as expert witnesses, for both the 
defense and the prosecution, in trials where an insanity 
defense has been offered. Kolasa (1972) provides a working 
definition of an expert witness: 11 An expert witness must be 
able to deduce correctly from hypothetical facts related to 
some profession, science or occupation beyond the scope of 
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the average layman and must have the knowledge, skill or 
experience in that area to help the triers of fact in 
his/their decisions" (p. 502). Two questions immediately 
present themselves. First, is psychology even relevant to 
·nsanity defense considerations? Second, is expert 
psychological testimony genuinely helpful to the jury? One 
must cone ude that these questions are presumed to be 
answerable in the affirmative, given the relative lack of 
attention they receive from profe ssionals in this area. 
· Indeed while the literature abounds with material which 
instructs on how to be a better expert witness or how to 
better deal wit opposing expert testimony, there has been 
relatively little comment on the proper role, much less the 
mere propriety, of expert psychological testimony. Gass 
(1981), in reviewing a study of the law/psychology 
interfac , also notes this unfortunate phenomenon: 
The chapter devoted to the expert witness is 
disappointing in sofar as it skirts the fundamental 
issue of what the psychological expert's role in 
the courtroom 'ought' to be. As psychologists 
enter their seventh decade as expert witnesses in 
the U.S., a few scholars have begun to challenge 
the utility of psychological techniques and 
testimony in resolving certain legal issues. The 
authors ..• pay scant attention to the question of 
whether the science of psychology, in general, is 
sufficiently accurate to justify its acceptance by 
courts as reliable and valid scientific evidence. 
(p. 339) 
So even though the existence and practice of expert 
psychological testimony is tacitly approved of by the 
psychological community 2 , the questions asked above are 
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still open ones, answ er ab l e i n a wi de variety of ways. 
Responses ra nge fr om ban i s hment of psychologists from court, 
to g iving pre eminence to psyc hol ogical evaluations over 
legal determi nations . The re mainder of this paper consists 
largely of a n exp lora t ion of these various responses, with 
an aim towards elucid a ting what t he role of the psycho-
logical expert ought to be, i f in fact psychologists are 
worthy of expert status i n the first place. 
The participa ti on of ps yc hologists in insanity cases 
has come to be considered a s both necessary and natural. 
Bromberg (1979) explain s t he pr ed omi nant viewpoint when he 
states t at '' interfer e nce with r e sponsibility for crime 
re uire psyc iatric ev a lu a ti on to aid the court in 
unraveling such kaleidoscopic k i nds of huma n behavior" 
(p. 59). However , this s eemin gly neutral explanation for 
expert psychiatric testimo ny in fact begs the question, 
insofar as no ju s tif ica t ion for the "requirement" is 
offered. In tr uth , the be havior of all people, disturbed or 
not, is more or le ss eq uall y kaleidoscopic, yet psycho-
logical testimony i s deemed irrelevant to most criminal 
proce e dings . Further, the indisputable fact that insanity 
defenses pr e da t e the modern sc i ences of psychology and 
psyc h i atry ar g ues against the "necessity" of expert 
psy c hologi c al test i mony. I am by no means disputing the 
propriety of having psychologists in court, only the view 
that they are necessary to the process. In fact, it is 
conceivable that an insanity case could be tried without 
experts at all (though I know of no such case). 
Nonetheless, psychologists are in court because defense 
attorneys ask them to support their clients' claims of 
insanity, and also because prosecutions need their own 
experts to refute those of the defense. Given the 
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obliga ions of a defense to do all it can on behalf of its 
cl · ent, s ractice appears legitimate and acceptable 
(although a ain, not necessary) . However, this legitimacy 
has been c allenged on the grounds that the testimony 
psychologists offer does not merit expert status. 
One line of attack upon expert psychological testimony 
is based upo the wide variety of such testimony that 
appear , finding its ultimate expression in the by now 
well-known courtroom battles of opposing psychological 
exper s. The question asked is how can a true science offer 
two opposing views simultaneously? Of course experts from 
many fields disagree, and this does not in itself diminish 
the legitimacy of providing expert testimony. However, this 
issue can be seen as part of the controversy over the 
scientific nature of psychology, as discussed in Chapter II. 
At that time, it was suggested that psychology could 
rightfully and usefully be considered as science, albeit 
science with a difference. But for many, this difference is 
deemed too large to represent merely a difference in degree. 
61 
It is viewed as a diffe~ence in kind, the difference between 
sc i e nc e and non-science. And indeed, the wide variety of 
expe rt t e s t i mony that even a single case may elicit is more 
e asily unde r s tood within a non-scientific context. Newman 
and Rogers ( 1983 ), non-scientists both, offer that 
"psychology and psy chi atry are a conglomeration of 
speculat · ve theori es, and ge nerally the theory that a 
particular psychia tr i s t wil l ~hoose is chosen for reasons 
other th a n sc ie nt if i c validation. He likes the sound or 
fee , or t he way the theory works for him." The various 
'camps" in psychology do not spend much of their time 
accusin each other of be i ng wrong, yet these camps stem 
from widely div erge nt theoretical positions, and result in 
equally diverse pract ices. Psychiatrist Leifer (1964) 
arrives at a simil ar conclusion: "It is a fact that the 
psy hiatrist i s usi ng his personal judgment, and not that 
psychiat r y i s a youn g or inexact science, that explains the 
notorio us d is a gr eeme nts between psychiatrists in courtroom 
proc edures" ( p. 827) . 
Rob i nson (1980) is another who challenges the presumed 
s c ientifi c nature of psychology, and in so doing even 
excludes the possibility of meaningful expert testimony: 
At present, given the nature of law as an 
institution and given the state of t he •social 
sciences,' there can be no meaning attached to the 
term 'expert testimony' as that term is used in 
connection with the insanity defense. There is no 
science of 'mental disease.' All that •expertise' 
can refer to here is a textbook knowledge of tests 
of doubtful validity, and a clinical knowledge of 
some of the eccentricities of the human mind. By 
none of the historical standards does crime qua 
crime qualify as a 'disease.' By none of the 
historical scientific standards does psychiatric 
or psychological testimony qualify as •evidence,' 
since such testimony does not confine itself 
publicly verifiable facts. (p. 63) 
Robinson's conclusion represents one extreme position on 
this is ue, yet his argument is well-taken, and could 
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usefully be considered as an attempt at balancing what has 
been a largely uncritical acceptance of expert psychological 
testimony. One problem with the argument is the repeated 
allusion to "historical standards." These standards are by 
no means cast in stone, and might reasonably be expected to 
ev lv and adapt to changing times. The reference to 
"publicly verifiable facts" is important, but is simply 
refle tive of Robinson's "non-scientific" critique, and in 
no way extends the argument. 
The question remains: Is psychology science, or not 
science, or science but different? The answer is debatable, 
but the question may in fact be academic, or even 
irrelevant. Whether good science or bad science or 
something else entirely, psychology as a field of endeavor, 
as a repository of immense amounts of information about 
human beings, is clearly the best available source of 
information about human behavior. Psychologists may know 
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less about human behavior than dermatologists know about 
sk i n, but no one knows more about human behavior than · 
psyc holo ists. The game may be primitive and sometimes 
conf using , but it is the only game in town, and psycho-
logists would seem entitled to expert status, if only by 
default . Beside s , al l of these arguments seem based on a 
faulty assumpti on , namel y that expert testimony needs to be 
scient.fic . Recalli ng the generic definition of expert 
testimony provided ear l ier , this is simply not true. 
Profe ssional t r ade or ga ni zations, among others, provide 
ex ert witnesses wi t hout makin g any claim to being 
scientific . 
The fo lo wing remarks by Ziskin (1975) are worth citing 
at len th for s ev e r al reasons. They clearly summarize the 
"non - sci e nc " arg ume nt against expert psychological 
te s timony . They a lso provide some insight into a practical 
and ver y r eal bas i s for appreciating the use, growth and 
acce ptance o f su c h testimony. Finally, it inadvertantly 
pr ovides a means of understanding, possibly even resolving, 
the con fusion centered on this issue: 
Despite the ever increasing utilization of 
psychiatric and psychological evidence in the 
lega l process, such evidence frequently does not 
meet reasonable criteria for admissibility and 
should not be admitted in a court of law and, if 
admitted, should be given little or no weight. It 
is unfortunate that because of the need of the 
courts for the assistance they hope these 
•experts' can provide, because of the requirement 
that attorneys use any means legally available to 
advance the cause of their clients, and because of 
the ignorance or unwillingness to face facts on 
the part of the experts involved, such testimony 
continues to be accorded scientific status. In 
the light of current scientific evidence, there is 
no reason to consider such testimony as other than 
highly speculative. (p. 1) 
Ziskin subverts, albeit understandably, his own argument 
when he refers to the "scientific status" of expert 
test · mony. He clearly misses the point. He implies that 
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the judgment of psychology by science is the critical issue, 
when the real issue is the law's judgment of psychology 
which, as discussed above, need not involve considerations 
of science at all. This can be explained by again returning 
to the medical model. Psychology's adoption of this model 
would imply a science parallel to medical science. As the 
scientific nature of psychology is disputed, the power of 
the med'cal model to impart legitimacy upon psychology is 
concomitantly reduced. Psychology thereby becomes less 
attractive as a source of expert testimony. 
In summary, psychology has developed a bit of a public 
relations problem, largely brought upon itself. There is 
irony in the fact that the "medical" part of medical model 
allowed psychology to gain acceptance in court, while the 
"model" part has now virtually turned on psychology and 
exposed its limitations. Nonetheless, expert psychological 
witnesses have been available to the courts for some time, 
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and should continue to be so. Besides, it will shortly 
become clear that the significant contentious issue is not 
psychology in court, but the specific testimony that 
psychologists often offer, testimony that often bears little 
relationship to psychological practice. In brief, expert 
psychological testimony would be far less controversial if 
it were limited to matters psychological. 
P ychologists are experts in psychology, and that is 
w at they should talk about. Neu (1980) suggests some basic 
parameters: ''What one wants from expert witnesses in an 
insanity defense trial is testimony about the nature and 
causes of any psycholog·cal incapacities from which an 
individual may suffer. Diagnostic labels and clinical 
conclusions are less important than the details on which 
they are based'' (p. 87). The point about labels and 
conclusions cannot be overstressed. Such may not only 
confuse both judges and juries, but as will be seen later, 
may actually impede juries in making their own connections 
and drawing their own conclusions. However, if psycho-
logical testimony stayed within the confines of Neu's 
suggestion, there would likely be little controversy over 
it. But a problem immediately arises when we recognize that 
the only incapacities that matter were those existing in the 
past, sometimes the distant past, when the specific crimes 
occured. It is one thing to testify about a current mental 
state; it is quite another to discuss a state of mind 
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tha t existed months, perhaps years in the past, and often 
well be f ore the expert witness examined the accused. This 
re t rospective analysis is risky at best, and such testimony 
i s r igh tfu ll y open to dispute. Such disputation is clearly 
pr esen te d by Zis k in (in Newman & Rogers, 1983): "Forensic 
psychiat r i s ts i n my opinion have misled the judiciary, the 
legislature and the ge neral public into believing that they 
have t e capacity t o ac c urately assess somebody's mental 
state mo ths prior to ever having seen them, when in fact 
there is no sci e nt if i c evide nce that will support that 
contention .'' This ob j ect i on cannot be sidestepped by 
employing my sugge s t e d conceptualization of psychology as 
science with a difference . I f psychologists cannot 
accurately post - diet men tal states, particularly to a 
singula r moment in ti me, they simply should not offer such 
testimony . 
Sadly , ano t her branch of expert testimony has shown 
psycholog · s ts more th an wil ling to offer testimony clearly 
bey ond t he i r com pete nc e. The matter of predictions of 
da ng erousness, more often applicable to civil cases but 
re l evant to criminal proceedings as well, has been 
exhaustively researched, and the evidence is clear: 
Psycholog i sts cannot accurately predict dangerousness (Lane 
& Kling, 1978; Morse, 1978; Shah, 1977; White, 1982). 
Despite the evidence, courts continue to ask psychologists 
to make such predictions, and many continue to oblige them. 
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Overextending the limits of their expertise is one 
problem; departing completly from their area of expertise is 
far more serious, yet this is ultimately the result of much 
expert psychological testimony. Recall the discussion of 
the legal and social nature of insanity tests. When 
psychologists offer testimony directly on the tests 
employed, they not only subvert the proper role of the jury, 
but they are clearly out of their element. For one thing, 
the language of insanity tests is decidedly non-
psychological. Haward (1979) suggests a problem with 
nomenclature: ''Psychologists are forced to compress their 
cientific concepts into purely legal notions like 'disease 
of the mind' which are meaningless to a scientist'' (p. 52). 
Th problem with language, however, is secondary to the fact 
that psychologists have no expertise to offer the court 
regarding issues of law and morality. Juries certainly have 
a right to any information psychologists may offer regarding 
a defendant claiming insanity. They also have the right to 
accept or reject such testimony as they see fit. But when 
psychologists comment directly on the ultimate issue of a 
defendant's sanity, they assume the roles of expert jurors, 
roles they have no qualifications for, roles they should not 
be invited to fill, roles which really do not even exist. 
Newman and Rogers (1983) elaborate: "Unfortunately, the way 
the law is presently structured, in things like the insanity 
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defense, the psychiatrist is required to make a conceptual 
leap. He must go from his diagnosis of schizophrenia, or 
his finding that this person had a serious distortion in the 
understanding of reality, to what is in essence a 
non-psychiatric conclu sion, a legal conclusion, namely that 
this person was not able to tell right from wrong; and this 
is the kind of thing that a psychiatrist is not 
scientifically or professionally equipped to do because they 
are really moral decisions." 
There are clearly many problems with expert psycho-
lo ical testimony. Not the least of which is psychology's 
apparent unwillingness to adapt to the conceptualizations 
and practices attendant to the legal arena, which are quite 
different from those it is familiar and comfortable with. 
On the other hand, the criminal justice system, for reasons 
of its own, has largely accommodated, and even encouraged 
psychology's awkward sojourns through the courts. There are 
significant social and historical forces at work here, 
forces which help to explicate both the excesses of expert 
psychological testimony as well as the courts' acceptance of 
such. Before examining these forces, Fingarette and Hasse 
(1979) offer a useful summary of the problems expert 
testimony engenders: "As things stand now, expert testimony 
reflects either of two unhelpful tendencies: either it 
moves into depths and nuances of diagnosis and of technical 
terminology that easily leaves a jury stranded; or it 
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achieves pseudo-clarity by allowing expert witnesses to 
offer a sequence of medical sounding cliches that conform 
verbally to legal formulas but provide no factual insight to 
the jury" (p. 11). 
D spite the often-heard complaint by psychologists that 
they are forced to compress their psychological testimony to 
accommodate legal standards, clearly no psychologists have 
been coerced or compelled to provide such testimony. Simply 
by v·rtue of its willing participation in the process must 
psychology bear at least part of the responsibility for the 
excesses of expert testimony. Not withstanding the 
remunerative as ects of such testimony, psychologists 
generally offer expert testimony with the conviction that 
they play an important and necessary part in the process, 
and at least indir ctly are furthering the cause of justice. 
To t e extent tl at this is true, it is not surprising to 
f i d psychology anxious to increase its standing and 
influence within the criminal justice system. The 
implementation of the Durham rule is the best example of 
psychology's efforts at adapting the system to its own 
standards and procedures. Even though Durham has long since 
been superseded, psychology's efforts to expand and solidify 
its influence have continued, to the point where many of its 
questionable activities go unchallenged. To attorney 
Dershowitz (1968), "it is a discouraging history of 
usurpation and abdication; of an expert being summoned for a 
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limited purpose, assuming his own indispensability, and then 
persuading the law to ask the critical questions in terms 
which make him more comfortable and his testimony more 
relevant to the questions posed, but to make the questions 
less relevant to the purposes of the law'' (p. 30). 
Although the end result Dershowitz refers to is perhaps 
less common today than it used to be, the process he 
describes may help us to understand the increasingly secure 
place of psychology within the criminal justice system. 
That psychology has expanded its influence is not open to 
question. A serious question does remain, however, as to 
whe er psy hology's influence has exceeded that which its 
ex ert status rightfully affords. This must be answered in 
the affirmative, and not just because psychology is 
answerin questions it should not be asked. Of greater 
concern is the message which the social sciences have subtly 
but consistently tried to convey to the courts as well as 
the general public, namely that there exist two distinct 
classes of people processed by the courts: criminals and 
the mentally disturbed. Psychology has put itself forward 
as being able to distinguish between these two groups. By 
virtue of this assertion, in conjunction with its 
unwillingness to both appreciate and accept the legal nature 
of legal standards of insanity, psychology has exceeded the 
limits of its expertise. In so doing, the nature of 
criminal justice as it relates to insanity has been 
significantly altered. Torrey (1974) has suggested that: 
by lobbying for the nonresponsibility for a class 
of individuals called the mentally ill, psychiatry 
has contributed large amounts of mud to the clear 
stream of reason. Psychiatrists have been allowed 
to gradually assume increasing responsibility for 
deciding who can stand trial, and, once on trial, 
who is guilty. The decision-making process has 
become increasingly me~ical and decreasingly 
judicial. (p. 184) 
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The medicalization of justice is a matter of grave concern, 
havi g the potential of undermining the entire system. Due 
to the confusion arising from differing uses of the term 
mental illness, as well as to the unwillingness of 
psychology to face up to the fact that legal standards and 
psychological ones are fundamentally different, this 
medicalization has proceeded slowly and subtly, but 
steadily. In fact, the changes have gone largely unnoticed, 
and their implications unconsidered. And to the extent that 
this medicalization of criminal proceedings has distorted 
the normal process of trial by jury, as it clearly has, then 
the implications for social policy are certainly serious and 
profound. Fortunately, the trends just discussed are not 
proceeding inexorably, and some indications of reversal and 
remedy will be discussed shortly. 
It would be both wrong and unfair to place the entire 
burden of responsibility for the excesses of expert 
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testimony completely upon the psychological practitioners 
who offer such testimony, simply because such testimony has 
largely been welcomed by the courts. Quite simply, such 
testimony allows the court to deal with certain individuals 
more easily and comfortably than if such testimony were not 
forthcoming. The extent to which the process is medicalized 
is the extent to which it has yielded decision-making 
authority, and therefore responsibility, for certain 
individuals, namely those persons pleading insanity. Such 
persons raise vexing problems for criminal justice, and 
deference to experts can provide an easy way out (Torrey, 
1974). 
The e problems are again related to the problem of 
different conceptions of mental illness, the ambiguity of 
insanity tests and the confusion regarding legal and 
psychological standards. Clearly, the legal community must 
come to grips with the same issues as the psychological 
community. Equally clearly, and again perhaps with the best 
of intentions, the criminal justice system has often seen 
fit to allow the excesses of expert testimony. Whatever the 
motivation, however, one cannot ignore the fact that the use 
of experts continually serves to take pressure off the 
courts to deal directly with certain contentious 
individuals. Leifer (1964), who focuses on the semantic 
aspects of these problems, suggests that "the use of a 
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' scientific exper t' to aid in the determination of respon-
sibility e ases the burden of t he court by giving the 
impression that t he de t er mina t ion rests on a scientifically 
determined fact rather t han on an ambiguous matter of 
semantics" (p . 827) . 
Szasz (1979), whose vi ews on what he considers the 
mythical status of ment a l il lness are by now well-known, 
logica ly applies his views t o th e med i ca l arena through the 
concept of psychiatric div e r s i on , which he defines as "any 
psychiatric intervention in connection with individuals who 
are charged with or convict ed of a crime, as well as with 
individuals whose 'misbehavi or ' mi ght but need not be 
construed as constituting l awbr eak i ng" (p. 135). Needless 
to say, Szasz strongly disappr oves of an y ex pert testimony, 
which represents one of the clearest expressions of 
psych · atric diversion . By vi r t ue of the controversial 
nature of Szasz' ba s ic views, concepts that arise from them 
will be no less contentious. However, the process Szasz 
describes, regardle s s of ho w it or iginates, does help to 
shed some light on t he reason for the courts' allowance of 
expe r t testimony wh ich may be excessive. Szasz is expanding 
on t he util it a r i an aspec t s of such testimony, from the 
courts ' po i nt of view, when he says that psychiatric 
d i ve rsion "provides a mechanism that simultaneously allays 
the citizens' guilt for punishing certain acts and actors, 
and satisfies their need for security by depriving certain 
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a c ts of their legitimacy and certain actors of their 
libe r t y" (p. 139). Unfortunately for Szasz, in arguing 
a gainst expert testimony he strongly, if paradoxically and 
unwil lingl y, supports the concept of an insanity defense. 
The s i mil a ri ties between the above and the discussed 
traditional under stand i ng of mental illness are undeniable. 
The idea that cert a in people who commit crimes should not be 
held r esponsible , by vi r t ue of craziness, irrationality, 
et . , has a long and l egit i mate tradition and is, after all, 
precisel y what ins ani ty tests attempt to convey. The fact 
that some juro r s migh t feel guilty about disposing of some 
cases without t he opt ion o f an insanity verdict if anything 
argues for the l e git imacy of such an option. Nonetheless, 
Szasz mi ht be more f av ora bl y d i sposed towards the process 
were it not fo r the inordinate influence that psychiatry and 
psychology have at t ained. It is precisely the extent of 
this i nflu e nce that the concept of psychiatric diversion is 
most t e lli ng l y addre s sed t o. Szasz a l so draws attention to 
the issue o f t he morality of punishment, an issue most 
wr ite r s in th i s area pay scant attention to. In sum, and 
a gain regardless of the origins of the concept, psychiatric 
d i version provides a reasonable conceptualization for 
understanding a process which c l early facilitates excessive 
expert testimony. So long as excessive testimony is 
accepted, Szasz' critique will have serious merit, "partly 
because psychiatric diversion subverts the rule of law, and 
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partly because the rhetoric of diagnosis and therapy diverts 
attention from the fact of wrong doing and the moral 
legitimacy of punishment" (Szasz, 1979, p. 235). 
There are, of course, other ways of viewing the problem 
of excessive testimony. Slovenko (1982) apparently views 
them as of little consequence, preferring instead to 
concentrate on what he views as the ultimately beneficial 
results that accrue to the system as a result of expert 
testimony of any ilk. His conclusion is worth repeating: 
Psychiatric testimony, whether or not acceptable, 
opens options to judge and jury. It brings 
flexibility and an element of humanity into the 
law. What is accepted as an excuse, or as proof, 
depends on whether one is sympathetic to it. The 
tendency is to find a causal nexus between one 
horrible condition or incident and another, 
although they may have little or nothing to do 
with each other. Whether a judge or jury accepts 
or declines excusing testimony is for them to 
decide - but without some testimony they may not 
be able to rationalize a decision they would like 
to return. The scale is the symbol of justice, 
but the court does not want measurement or 
empirical evidence. Empirical evidence is too 
boring, too dehumanizing, and would not fulfill 
the function of the trial as a morality play. 
(p. 119) 
It is interesting that an analysis which clearly contains 
elements of psychiatric diversion is so favorable to the 
enterprise. More to the point, the acceptability of 
psychiatric testimony is too important a question to be 
glossed over. However, the question of acceptability may be 
answered by considering the confusion the · passage shows 
between what constitutes evidence and what constitutes 
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de c is i ons. Experts are intended to provide evidence to help 
j ur ie s r e ac h dec isions. Whe n "excusing testimony" is 
offered, this is no longer evidence, but a conclusion, a 
deci s i on which is meant to be decided by a jury. Excusing 
testimony is the r e by unacceptable, as it clearly exceeds the 
com etence of any expert, and i mproperly impedes the jury in 
its pursuit of justice, via an impartial weighing of the 
evidence given in te s timony . 
After examining the confusio n that dominates this 
intersection of law an d psyc holog y, it would be surprising 
indeed if such confu s ion had not permeated the most critical 
link in the process , namely t he jury it~elf. If laywers and 
psychologists approach t he i nte r f a ce without a firm grasp, 
or at least concern wi t h the esse ntial issues, then juries 
will quite nat ur a l ly react to this confusion in their 
deliberations . Simon ( 1980), reporting on some of her 
extensive work with experimental jury situations, states: 
Durin g t he trial, in cross examination both 
defen se ps ychi atrists had insisted that insanity 
was a judi c ial term and involved a determination 
wh i ch they di d not feel qualified to make. This 
statement was a source of considerable puzzlement 
i n practically every deliberation. One juror 
expressed it this way: 'What I don't clearly 
understand i s are we talking in terms of legal 
insan i ty; or technical insanity; or medical 
i nsan i ty, the jargon of the psychiatrists?' 
( p. 59) 
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It is insufficient to simply say that jury confusion is but 
a reflection of the confusion of the professionals involved. 
Rather, and as the above quote merely hints, jury confusion 
is directly related to excessive expert testimony. Simon 
refers to an often-heard disclaimer that many experts make, 
w erein they rightfully express their limitations in 
answering legal questions. Unfortunately, this disclaimer 
is then, as often as not, cavalierly cast aside, and the 
legal questions are answered anyway. It is no wonder that 
juries get confused. First they hear the experts provide 
information which may help them arrive at a verdict, then 
they hear a verdict suggested to them. The difference 
between a jury arriving at a verdict, using data provided by 
experts in the process, and a jury simply deciding to agree 
or disagree with one or more experts, is no less than the 
di ference between trial by jury, a hallmark of democratic 
l"fe, and trial by experts, a concept without legal status 
and decidedly undemocratic in its implications. This is the 
subversion of the jury's role to which I have referred 
throughout this paper. Juries find themselves trying to 
resolve issues which should not even be issues. "The jury 
worked hard at resolving to their own satisfaction the 
problem of who should have final say about what happens to 
the defendant - a jury of laymen or a group of medical 
experts" (Simon, 1980, p. 58). The answer to this question 
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is so obv i ous that it shou l d not even be asked. That it is 
asked is sim pl y ref l ective of psychology's unwillingness to 
heed its own d i sc l aimers. If psychologists ceased answering 
questions inap pr opr i ate to them, juries would be much more 
able to fill , and more sure of, their roles and 
responsibilities . 
On the other ha nd , there are ways for psychological 
experts to help . They s hou l d provide information about 
defendants that judge and j ury mi gh t otherwise not hear. 
Testimony should avoid any professional jargon which could 
confuse a jury . Retrospecti ve probab i lity data and clinical 
impressions ma y be provi ded (Mo rse, 1978), and the witness 
should be sure to convey the nat ure of su c h evidence. As 
discussed, psychology is a sc i ence rather unique unto 
itself, and this spec ial nature needs to be communicated to 
the jury, not hidden from it behind medical sounding cliches 
and te r minology. Parti cu l ar care should be used in offering 
testimony about an i nd i vi dual's conduct or thought that 
occu rr ed well before an y court-related psychiatric 
eval uation. Informed opinion is welcome, but again only so 
l on g as it i s presented as such. 
Ideally, test i mony directly on matters of mental 
il l ness or psych i atric diagnosis should present no problem, 
for jurors would be clear on the important distinctions 
between legal and psychiatric standards, and understanding 
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of the fact that the two bear no necessary relationship to 
each other. However, the criminal justice system is far 
from an ideal system, and the inclusion of such testimony 
only serves to cloud the issues to be decided. Besides, it 
is specific information the jury needs, not the labels the 
professionals use to organize the information. Under 
current circumstances, labels may impede rather than help 
the jury. Accordingly, Morse's (1978) prescription for 
proper expert testimony seems well within reason: 
In sum, in my opinion mental health professionals 
should not testify about diagnoses or report 
conclusion about mental illness or even 
abnormality. They should simply tell the court 
about the allegedly disturbed person's thoughts, 
feelings and actions that the court is not likely 
to hear from family, friends, neighbors or other 
lay observers. Then the judge or jury can decide 
the legal issue of normality presented by the 
behavior of the disturbed person. (p. 396) 
The recent and locally celebrated insanity defense 
trial of Thomas Provenzano provides bountiful evidence for 
the types of testimonial excess I have been addressing. The 
trial itself was fairly typical, dominated as it was by the 
now familiar battle of the experts. Also as is typical, 
most witnesses were not at all reticent about addressing the 
issue of the defendant's sanity directly. But perhaps of 
even greater concern is the expert testimony offered before 
the trial began. As is customary in cases such as this, 
three psychiatrists were appointed to examine Provenzano to 
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determine competency to stand trial. This really means 
no t hi ng more than that the defendant can understand the 
ch ar ges a gainst him/her, and can cooperate with his or her 
attorney in preparin g a defense. However, two of the 
psychiatris ts in this c ase offered far more than an 
evaluation of compete ncy to stan d trial. As reported in the 
Orlando Sentinel of Feb r uary 25, 1984 (Trager, 1984a), 
''(P ychiatr ' st A), thou gh ack nowledging that Provenzano had 
suffered from ps ychological problems, concluded that he was 
sane at the time of the s hooting and is competent to stand 
trial'' (p. BS) . A se cond expert offered a similar 
appraisal . Though I hav e s poken earlier of the problems 
wit expe r ts answe r ing qu e stions they should not be asked, 
here we have expert s answer i ng questions they were not asked 
at all . As di s t urbing as suc h pronouncements are, more so 
is the fact th a t no ob j e c tion was made, in any public 
quarter , to the experts offering them. Other experts 
d i s agr eed , of course, but no one disputed the propriety of 
maki ng and a i ring such judgments. Such a situation offers 
compellin g evidence for the increased medicalization of the 
legal process, at least insofar as insanity is concerned, as 
well as for the institutionalization, and thereby implied 
legitimacy, of such medicalization. The tragedy is that 
this process has occurred slowly and subtly, so that few are 
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even aware of how the nature of the legal process has been 
altered. 
The trial itself, not surprisingly, contained the same 
excesses. On June 19, 1984 (Trager, 1984b), the Sentinel 
featured a front page story headed "Doctors say Provenzano 
was sane", and the lead paragraph reads: "Three court-
appointed psychiatrists testified for the prosecution Monday 
that Thomas Provenzano was legally sane at the time of the 
shootout" (p. A1). Again we clearly see the technical 
problems associated with post-dieting a state of mind 
existent well before the psychiatric interview. More 
importantly, we see a subversion of the jury's purpose; 
experts mak · ng judgments only a jury should make, juries 
getti g confused, and justice suffering. 
By now it is clear that the problems of excessive 
expert testimony cannot be separated from the problems with 
currently used insanity tests. These two areas are 
connected in myriad, subtle, but always symbiotic ways. 
Accordingly, no amount of reducing excessive psychological 
testimony will be sufficient to clear up the confusion and 
injustice at the interface without a concomitant effort to 
improve insanity statutes, which both support and allow for 
such testimony. Along these lines, the "Disability of Mind" 
doctrine (DOM) of Fingarette and Hasse (1979) merits strong 
consideration. It states: 
If a person's mental powers are impaired in such a 
way as to disable him at least to some material 
extent fro m rational control of his conduct in 
respect to t he requirements of the criminal law, 
the person in that respect acts with materially 
l essened criminal responsibility. If the 
impa i rment is of such magnitude that he is in 
ch i ef part disabled, he acts in that respect 
without c r i minal responsibility. (p. 200) 
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T is doct r in e is valuable for a number of readily apparent 
reasons. Mo s t bas i cally, it captures better than any other 
s andard the hi sto r i cal and popular understanding of what it 
means to be ment a l ly ill. It makes no reference to disease 
or mental de fe c t, a nd in fact would de-medicalize the 
insanity de fen se. Expert ps ychological testimony would then 
become an optiona l part of the process, not an inherent 
aspect . In short, t he su ggestion that psychologists offer 
les n thei r te st imony, particularly as regards conclusion 
d ra win , is likely to ac h i eve real meaning only in the 
context of a l egal standard such as DOM. By placing 
deci si o n-making power firmly in the hands of the jury, where 
i t r igh tl y be l on gs, DOM could go a long way towards 
res t oring expert testimony to its rightful purpose of simply 
a i d i ng the jury in its task. 
While DOM has much to recommend it, it is not perfect. 
Though it would set a legal standard, the central concept of 
rationality goes largely undefined, and as such is open to 
varying interpretation. But perhaps it cannot be otherwise, 
for as a social concept rationality may require a degree of 
flexibility and adaptability to accommodate the infinitely 
83 
wi de variety of situations where it is an issue. Fingarette 
an d Ha s se ( 19 79 ) po i nt out that "the discrepancy between a 
defend an t's actual capacities and those normally presumed 
must be ass e ss ed i n l ight of the specific circumstances of 
the particu la r a c t. The j ury must decide whether the 
discrepancy is enough , and ?f suitable kind, to ascribe 
non - responsibility '' ( p. 23 3). 
DOM is unique in other respe c ts. No t only does it 
allow for findings of compl e t e o r partial disability, but 
the jury would also det ermi ne whether the defendant had any 
culpability in his or her d i sa bil i ty. Such a determination 
· s absen in other in sa nity tes t s, and its inclusion gives 
jurors needed flexibi lity i n assessing responsibility. The 
criminal justice sy s tem would do well to look closely at 
DOM. 
CHAPTER IV 
Looking Ahead 
The p ' ctu r e I ha ve draw n of the interface of criminal 
justice and ps ycholog y is admittedly less than flattering. 
Some mig t vie w my conc erns about the dangers of excessive 
xper test·mony t o the e ntire system as alarmist. It is 
true hat the issues I have discussed have been considered 
by relat'vely few un til fair l y recently. However, I have 
trie to show that these issues have actually been with us 
for many hundreds of yea r s. I t is only the fact of the 
cur · ous evo ution of t he law / psy chology interface that has 
served to dimin ish both public and professional awareness of 
th basic issues , i ss ues concerning rights and responsi-
bilities . In s hort , the concerns I voice are not new or 
origi nal; it i s, ho wever, extremely difficult for them to 
find wide exp r ess i on within the current legal-psychological 
climate . 
The re have been some encouraging developments. In 
198 2 , the California Penal Code (1982) was changed to 
proh i bit expert psychological witnesses from offering 
conclusions on the matter of sanity, thereby restoring 
ultimate decision-making power to the jury, where it 
properly belongs. This is an important step, but only a 
first step. The code still allows the court to accept 
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expert testimony about a defendant's state of mind at the 
t i me of an a l le ged offense. The line between legal and 
psychologic al standards will almost certainly remain blurry, 
a nd urors wi l l co nt inue to be confused. Still, California 
juries may now ha ve a be tter sense of their own 
responsibi ities . 
A s · ro · lar change we nt into effect in the federal courts 
in late 1984 . According t o the A.P.A. Mon i tor, "the 
men al health expe r t wil l be restricted in court to 
explaining the nat ure of the defendant's mental disease or 
defect . The witne s s will be prohibited from commenting on 
wheth r that condition cont ributed to the commission of the 
crime, that is , if it pr e ve nted the defendant from under-
standing that he was committing a wrongful act'' (Cunningham, 
1984, p. 25) . Onc e agai n a very positive step, yet still 
the medical mod e l remai ns quite intact, and only time will 
tell if thi s one cha ng e, important as it is, will translate 
into mo r e ge nui ne dec i sion-making power being returned to 
ur i e s . 
To r ecap itu l a t e this thesis: The insanity defense, a 
l e gal and social instrument, has attended virtually all 
human l egal systems. It is basically a manifestation of a 
deeply felt and historically held concept wherein a lack of 
rationality implies at least a diminution of ascribed 
responsibility. Problems surfaced with the development of 
the social sciences, most particularly psychology and 
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ps yc hiatry. Through a process both complex and convoluted, 
le gal standards and psychological practice became not just 
intertwined, but confused. As insanity statutes became more 
scien tif i c sounding, and as social scientists strove to 
become , or at l east appear, more scientific, the judicial 
process became l ess j ust, in the sense that ''trial by one's 
peers," a time-hon ored, democratic ideal, appears to have 
been significantly comprom i sed. The evolution of insanity 
tests and the r i se i n t he influence of expert psychological 
witnesses follow pa r a lle l paths, and are in fact mutually 
sustainin proc es ses . I t is impossible to specify clearly 
how we ot from th e re , whe n justice was administered without 
any experts at all , t o here, where expert testimony is often 
excessiv , and where con c lus i ons that are uncalled for, even 
unasked, are rou t in ely answered. 
There is cer t ainly need for further research. We need 
to underst a nd mor e about how juries operate, about the 
d i fferenti a l effects of various insanity tests. We need to 
e xami ne clos el y such alternative ideas as DOM to see how 
t he y ma y hel p improve the system. We need to know more 
about such admittedly amorphous but important concepts as 
responsibility; how it develops, how it changes, how people 
apply it to themselves and others. Yes, there is a lot we 
need to know. But far more urgent is the need for others to 
know that which is already available. In researching this 
paper I have become convinced that everyone needs to know 
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more about the workings of the law. Lawyers and judges need 
to know much more about psychology - its basic concepts, its 
practices, and equally important its limitations and 
shortcomings. Psychologists working in this area need far 
greater understanding of not only contemporary legal 
practice, but its underlying philosophy as well. In short, 
there is a far more pressing need for education than 
research. Of course, in this regard, research into means of 
accomplishing the varied types of education needed is both 
urgent and necessary. 
Speaking for psychology, there is much we can do. We 
can stop answering questions beyond our competence, which 
i nc ludes making conclusions on strictly legal matters. We 
should remind ourselves, and help others to become aware of 
the fact that insanity is not a psychological concept, and 
that we really have nothing to say about it directly. Above 
all, and inherent in all my comments, is the need for 
greater honesty, first with ourselves, and then with others. 
The medical model opened up many doors for psychology, but 
may now impede its progress in the legal arena. By 
detaching ourselves from this model even a little bit, we 
may find more avenues to understanding open to us. Psycho-
logy will be enhanced, not diminished, by its owning up to 
its limitations; it would only open up more possibilities, 
and offer some hope of furthering the cause of justice. As 
Robinson (1973) warns, "The greatest danger is that the 
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public will think we know what we are doing instead of 
appreciating the experimental nature of our enterprise. 
Recognizing that it is experimental, society will be able to 
determine the extent to which it wishes to participate" (p. 
1 33) . 
Throughout this paper I have used the term excessive to 
describe expert testimony which is inappropriate and 
un · ust . fied. The word is useful in that it clearly 
specifies a simple and straightforward remedy, for this is 
surely a case where less is better. In order to insure that 
juries continue to make needed judgments, in an atmosphere 
ot d mina ed by expert pronouncement, it is necessary only 
that the experts refrain, or be restrained, from promoting 
the ' r own conclusions, conclusions only juries should make. 
We need onstantly to remind ourselves of the disclaimer the 
experts often make but then forget. The ultimate finding to 
be arrived at is a social judgment, and psychology has no 
expertise to offer in making such judgments (Gass, 1981). 
In short, a psychologist should never offer an opinion 
as to a defendant's sanity. There can be little doubt that 
if this serious testimonial excess were eliminated, much of 
the criticism leveled against expert testimony would 
evaporate. For example, Robinson's (1980) contention that 
"the inclusion of such 'experts' places jurors in the 
position of diagnosticians once they accept the testimony of 
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'experts' as evidence'' (p. 63) would lose most of its 
relevance and impact in the absence of conclusion drawing by 
the experts. There should be no serious objection to 
experts helping in the decision-making process, so long as 
they just help and do not themselves decide. 
AUTHOR NOTES 
1For purposes of this paper, and despite their many 
real world differences, the terms psychology and psychiatry, 
psychologist and psychiatrists, etc., will be used 
interchangeably. 
2 rn a closely related area, White (1982) reports the 
results of a survey of Ohio psychologists, of whom 72% 
thought psychologists should be involved in dealth penalty 
proceedings, while only 18% thought they should not be 
involvea at all. 
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